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Uncommon Approaches to Commons
Problems: Nested Governance Commons and
Climate Change
†‡

Blake Hudson* and Jonathan Rosenbloom**
Natural capital resources crucial to combatting climate change are potentially subject to
tragic overconsumption absent a requisite degree of vertical government regulation of
resource appropriators and/or horizontal collective action among resource appropriators.
In federal systems, these vertical and horizontal approaches may (or may not) take place
in any one of four scales—local, state, national, and global—“nested” one within another.
Prior research has described how natural capital in federal systems of government,
though privatized and/or subject to government regulation, may nonetheless remain in a
tragic plight due to the allocation of governance authority in federal systems—an
allocation that may or may not legally entrench the commons dynamic. This Article
builds on that research to present a clearer picture of the complexity of natural capital
resource commons and does so by first deconstructing the nested commons scales and
describing for the first time a number of legal authority and political action scenarios that
may either resolve natural capital commons dilemmas or facilitate commons tragedies
within the scales of a federal governance structure. The Article then details the
“divergent” vertical regulatory and horizontal collective action approaches to managing
climate-crucial natural capital within each scale. The Article concludes by pointing
toward future scholarship exploring how these “divergent” approaches within scales can
become “convergent” by taking into account both legal constraints that may exist on
vertical regulation across scales as well as geopolitical circumstances positively or
negatively impacting political action within scales. This convergent approach encourages
the proper management of natural capital resources by more fully accounting for the
complexities of the federal governance commons.

† This Article is dedicated to the memory and scholarship of Elinor Ostrom, who inspired this
work and many others during her long and impactful career.
‡ For his comments and insights, we wish to thank Professor Jerry Anderson. For his excellent
research assistance we also wish to thank John Remus, Drake University Law Student. Finally, we wish to
thank the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their wonderful efforts, suggestions, and edits.
* Associate Professor, Joint Appointment, LSU Law Center and LSU School of the Coast and
Environment, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. I am exceedingly grateful to my co-author, Jonathan
Rosenbloom, for being a tremendous partner in this project.
** Associate Professor, Drake University Law School. I would also like to thank my co-author,
Blake Hudson, for being a great resource of information and for making this project an enjoyable one.
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Introduction and Theoretical Content
Commons resources are at risk of being tragically over-consumed
absent some mechanism to adjust the potential self-interested rationality
of commons users. Scholars have thoroughly analyzed three primary
mechanisms that may be used to rein in the potential rationality of
commons appropriators: (1) government regulation, (2) private property
rights, and (3) the “successful collective action” model developed by 2009
Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom. These mechanisms are implemented in
a variety of ways. Some natural resources are subject almost exclusively to
a private property rights solution, while others are owned or managed
exclusively by the government. Other resources are both privatized and
subject to government oversight in their management. Yet others may
constitute the purest form of a commons, subject neither to private
property rights nor government regulation, being managed directly by a
common pool of users.
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While appropriators of resources may certainly self-regulate and act
against rational self-interest by altruistically managing the resources over
which they maintain control in a sustainable manner, appropriators often
act in their rational self-interest in the absence of a suitable degree of
higher-level government intervention (“vertical coordination”) or
purposeful, coordinated collective action with other horizontally situated
actors (what we also refer to throughout this Article as “self1
coordination”). Such is the case in the United States for many types of
resources—or what we also refer to here as “natural capital”—that act as
either significant carbon sources or sinks and are therefore crucial to
regulating climate change. Many of these resources, even if privatized, are
not managed pursuant to a cooperative self-coordinated strategy and may
not be subject to government regulatory inputs designed to achieve the
objectives of much needed climate change policy.
Whether it be forests, terrestrial or coastal wetlands, or agricultural
resources, a wide range of management approaches may be
implemented—or perhaps more frequently not implemented—both
horizontally within levels of government (global, national, state, or local)
or among private property owners, and vertically across levels of
government and private properties. These approaches may have
potentially tragic consequences for natural capital crucial to regulating
climate change. Assume, for example, that state governments are actors
appropriating natural capital on one scale of governance—the “national
2
scale.” The federal government currently maintains no direct inputs into
the management of 60% of U.S. forests, which are privately owned and
subject almost exclusively to state regulatory authority. This represents
the vertical component in which a higher level of government, the federal
government, manages (or fails to manage) natural capital by regulating
resource appropriation within state jurisdictions, situated one scale
down. Simultaneously, state governments’ forest management policies
are all over the board on their level of regulatory stringency. While some
states maintain fairly stringent forest management standards, others,
particularly in the Southeast, maintain none at all. This represents the
horizontal component in which actors appropriating natural capital on
the same scale manage (or fail to manage) natural capital through
collective action. This description presents a classic tragedy of the
commons problem, whereby a number of actors (here, the fifty state

1. Throughout this Article we use the phrases “horizontal collective action” and “horizontal selfcoordination” interchangeably.
2. Throughout this Article, we refer to local, state, and national governments as “appropriating”
resources similar to herders on an open pasture. We do not mean that they are necessarily engaged in
direct appropriation, though that may certainly be the case. Rather, these governments most often
facilitate private appropriation activities through the stringency (or lack thereof) of their rules for
natural capital appropriation.
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governments) may act as rational herders and appropriate resources
from a single resource system (forests within the United States), with
many states doing so without instituting appropriate mechanisms of
resource management. It is perhaps no surprise, then, that the U.S.
Forest Service projects that urbanization and other factors will remove
13% of all southeastern forests over the next fifty years, not only creating
3
a significant source of carbon but also removing a crucial carbon sink.
While this example analyzing one scale of governance helps
illustrate the classic tragedy of the commons scenario, natural capital
resources like U.S. forests are subject to a far more complex commons
phenomenon than the classic case—a complexity that arises out of a threedimensional vertically and horizontally integrated resource management
arrangement that is exemplified by a federal governance structure. Indeed,
descriptions of commons resources and solutions for their management are
often oversimplified. In the United States, given that there is very little
natural capital subject to a pure common-pool arrangement, the resource
management challenge is often framed, somewhat two-dimensionally, as
about striking the appropriate balance between the two extremes of
private property and government regulation, or about preserving the
values of private property ownership in balance with the values that
natural capital provides to the public at large.
One problem with this limited inquiry is that it presumes that once
private property rights, government regulation, or both, are in place for
managing natural capital, the commons dilemma has disappeared. This
presumption is based on the belief that while there were once resources
open to all and subject to tragic overconsumption, now those resources are
either privatized or regulated, thereby eliminating the commons or
4
associated tragedy. In reality, as described in recent scholarship, the
commons dilemma has not disappeared. Rather, both the entities labeled
commons herders and the scale of the resource system to which they
maintain access have simply shifted.
To see this more clearly, consider an illustration based upon key
aspects of commons scholarship. Commons analysis is typically framed in
the context of resource “appropriators” appropriating “resource units” of
5
natural capital from a “resource system.”
The “scales” that we refer to in this Article contain “resource
systems” that are geographically bounded by national, state, or local

3. David N. Wear & John G. Greis, U.S. Forest Serv., The Southern Forest Futures Project:
Summary Report 26–31, 35 (2011).
4. See generally Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested Commons
Governance, 63 Ala. L. Rev. 1007 (2012); Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at the Pool: State
Preemption, Common Pool Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations, 36 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 445 (2012).
5. See infra notes 14–17.
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jurisdictional boundaries. In a federal system of government, there are
several scales to which commons analysis may be applied. There is the
national scale in which the national resource system is embedded, the
state scale in which fifty distinct state resource systems are embedded,
and the local scale in which thousands of local government resource
systems and private property resource systems are embedded.
Furthermore, each of these resource systems is embedded within the
ultimate scale, the global resource system. As we adjust our focus from
one type of resource system on one scale to another resource system on
another scale, it is necessary to adopt a new perspective on both the
entities considered herders on the commons and the common pool of
natural capital to which these herders maintain access.
For example, on the national scale, states are the herders who may
(or may not) horizontally coordinate their appropriation of resource units
of natural capital from the national resource system, or whose
appropriation may (or may not) be subject to vertical coordination by the
federal government. Yet in shifting to the state scale, we see that local
governments are the herders who may (or may not) horizontally
coordinate their appropriation of resource units of natural capital from
the state resource system, or whose appropriation may (or may not) be
subject to vertical coordination by the state government (which is now
the vertical actor rather than the horizontal actor, as on the national
scale). Shifting scales allows us to see that in the absence of horizontal
self-coordination or vertical regulatory coordination by a higher level of
government, private property owners may act as herders on local
commons, local governments as herders on the state commons, state
governments as herders on the national commons, and national
governments as herders on the global commons.
Another problem presented by the limited inquiry, most relevant for
the purposes of this Article, is that it seemingly assumes that the interplay
between appropriators, the commons, and associated resources is
relatively identical regardless of (1) the scale on which the vertical or
horizontal management approaches are implemented and (2) geopolitical
and jurisdictional differences found among resource systems located on
the same scale. The limited inquiry is again two-dimensional,
oversimplifying both the vertical and the horizontal approaches to
commons resource management. This oversimplification fails to fully
account for legal differences in the various scales that affect the viability of
vertical or horizontal management approaches across scales and also fails
to take into account geopolitical differences that may arise among
similarly situated horizontal actors that can affect their choice of
horizontal versus vertical approaches.
Stated differently, there are two important components that
together constitute a third dimension of federal governance commons
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analysis. The first component is what we term “geolegal” differences
6
across scales of governance. These come in the form of legal constraints
placed on either higher-level governmental entities that prevent vertical
regulation or on higher- or lower-level entities that prevent them from
taking successful horizontal collective action for resource management.
These constraints may arise out of either constitutional or legislative
restrictions—such as limitations on the federal government under
Commerce Clause analysis or preemption of local government regulatory
authority by state governments. The second component comes in the
form of geopolitical differences horizontally across jurisdictions, whereby
vertical or horizontal approaches to commons management may be more
or less viable depending on the political circumstances in similarly
situated horizontal regions.
The limited analysis would conclude that the government within a
single scale vertically regulates to avoid the commons dilemma (the first
dimension) or that actors horizontally coordinate in a way that avoids the
commons dilemma (the second dimension), and that both horizontal and
vertical action are equally viable as applied to, and take place in a
uniform manner across, that single scale, thus ignoring geolegal
constraints and geopolitical differences across and within scales (the
third dimension). In fact, a federal system of government contains
multiple two-dimensional (vertical-horizontal) scales stacked one on top
of another, or “nested” one within another. So private property owners
may horizontally coordinate with each other or be subject to higher
levels of governmental authority, as may local governments, state
governments, and even national governments. Furthermore, the
multiple, two-dimensional scales of government are embedded in a
three-dimensional structure created by distinct geolegal constraints
vertically and horizontally across scales and geopolitical circumstances
horizontally across jurisdictions. The geolegal and geopolitical
environments being different across scales may influence how the herders
view and interact with their respective commons and with each other.
By way of illustration and looking at the state scale in isolation, the
limited analysis would simply consider whether the State of Alabama
vertically regulates private forest management (the first dimension) or

6. Highlighting “geolegal” differences simply recognizes that vertical regulation and horizontal
collective action do not take place in the same way within different scales due to different legal
environments. For example, the federal government may be restrained from regulating some activities
at the state and local levels because those powers are reserved to states under the Tenth Amendment.
This is a geolegal difference from vertical regulation at the state level, where the same constitutional
provision does allow the state to vertically regulate lower-level scales regarding that subject matter.
“Geolegal” also encapsulates different legal circumstances across horizontal jurisdictions. For
example, there are good arguments that the federal government may vertically regulate certain aspects
of subnational forest management under the Commerce Clause, whereas the Canadian federal
government clearly may not under the Canadian Constitution.
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private foresters in Alabama horizontally coordinate their forest
management activities (the second dimension), or some combination of
the two, to avoid the commons dilemma. This two-dimensional analysis,
however, ignores the fact that different scales might also maintain
regulatory inputs into forest management, such as the federal
government or Alabama’s many local governments. Yet the viability of
these regulatory inputs may be quite variable. The federal government,
for example, may be subject to constitutional constraints on its authority
to regulate private forests in Alabama under Commerce Clause analysis.
Similarly, some states may legislatively preempt local governments from
setting their own forest management standards in lieu of or supplemental
to state mandates, while Alabama may encourage such supplemental
regulation. Furthermore, the two-dimensional analysis overlooks the fact
that a different balance of vertical regulation or horizontal collective
action may manifest within the state scale in different regions of the
United States. A vertical private forest management approach may be
more likely, for example, in Oregon than in Alabama. In the same way, a
vertical regulatory approach to regulating land-use planning related to
urban growth boundaries might be more appropriate in the Pacific
Northwest, since geopolitics makes such an approach more viable,
whereas geopolitical considerations make a vertical regulatory approach
far less viable in the southeastern United States.
Rather than grappling with this three-dimensional complexity,
solutions to the primary problems associated with resource management
are often framed as limitations on a readily identifiable number and type
of externalities that may spill over jurisdictional boundaries with uniform
geopolitical characteristics to create isolated environmental harms. Yet
avoiding commons tragedies in the federal governance structure in which
private property rights and government regulation are embedded will
often require an adjustment of horizontal and vertical relationships
among relevant actors within a single scale—the first and second
dimensions—and consideration of the geolegal impacts stemming from
multiple scales nested one within another and the geopolitical differences
across horizontal scales—the third dimension. When scholars focus too
acutely on the variety of externalities that exist even in the presence of
private property rights or government regulation, the magnitude of the
tragedy of the commons attributes of the problem is diminished.
Ultimately, the limited, two-dimensional vertical/horizontal analysis
prevalent in current law and policy debates both overlooks the commons
attributes of federal systems and ignores the fact that the federal system
of government results in multiple two-dimensional vertical and horizontal
relationships nested one within another that may influence the commons
dynamic. It fails to holistically account for the many government scales
vertically that may establish rules of resource management for private
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properties or lower levels of government. Similarly, such analysis fails to
account for the ways in which multiple actors on different scales (private
property owners or various levels of government) may work
simultaneously with other actors on the same plane to tackle commons
challenges at each scale, and how their efforts may interact with vertically
scaled governments. Once these considerations are fully integrated into
commons analysis, we see that depending upon the relationship between
private property rights and government regulation on any one scale,
commons tragedies may yet occur for natural capital absent an
adjustment in the relationship between the multiple, two-dimensional
scales where horizontal coordination or vertical regulation may occur—
again, nested one within another as depicted in Figure 1. The resource
management challenge is anything but a two-dimensional balance within
single scales of governance.
Figure 1

Importantly, the three-dimensional horizontal and vertical
interactions themselves, particularly in a federal system of government,
can act as what may be termed a “nested governance commons” within
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which natural resource commons are embedded. Within each horizontal
scale, the rules of resource management allowed by the governance
framework (what we refer to here as “legal authority”) and the resource
management actions actually undertaken at that level (what we refer to
here as “political action”) interplay with the natural environment to
provide a complete picture of the complexity of the commons, as herders
may appropriate natural capital from each commons scale and across
scales with tragic consequences. In the absence of a higher level of
government maintaining legal authority or exercising political action to
regulate, or in the absence of legal authority or political action to
horizontally coordinate with each other, private property owners may act
as herders within local government commons, local governments may act
as herders within state commons, states may act as herders within
national commons, and nations may act as herders within the global
commons. The overlay of segmented vertical jurisdictions and vertical
regulatory authority over a myriad of individual horizontal jurisdictions
creates a nested commons that is especially salient within federal systems
of government, like the United States, where regulatory governance
jurisdictions are legally divided both horizontally and vertically.
This Article builds on and merges prior research by each of the
Authors, further refining an examination of the complexity and operation
of this three-dimensional nested governance commons within which
natural capital is managed. It offers a more precise, theoretical conception
of commons solutions addressing the nested federal system commons. This
Article begins to deconstruct the three dimensions by looking primarily at
the first two dimensions described above: horizontal versus vertical
mechanisms for managing natural capital commons within successive,
nested scales. (The further complexities provided by the third, geolegalgeopolitical dimension will be the focus of future scholarship building on
this Article.)
Part I provides a basic background on the tragedy of the commons
and the resources at which the various mechanisms of commons
management have traditionally been directed, including traditional natural
capital crucial to climate regulation. This Part next examines federal
systems of government within which natural resource commons are
embedded as a nested governance commons, which in turn may be
considered a “new commons” resource in the commons lexicon. Part II
next attempts to “de-nest” the nested federal governance commons within
which natural resource commons are embedded. This Part dissects the
cross section at which the natural resource commons and nested
governance commons meet, and how commons problems may either arise
or be resolved in the presence of a variety of scenarios depending upon the
presence of government legal authority, governmental political action, or
both, within each scale.
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Part III then provides tangible examples exemplifying the divergent
7
(or uncommon) approaches that may be implemented within each
individual, isolated scale to avoid tragedies for natural capital crucial to
combatting climate change—namely horizontal self-coordination within
the scale or vertical regulatory coordination by the governmental entity
the next scale up. Part III’s discussion lays the foundation for future
research exploring a convergent (or common) approach to addressing
commons problems. Analysis of a convergent approach to tackling
commons problems necessarily takes into account the various complexities
arising at the vertical/horizontal intersection of natural capital commons in
the context of the third dimension discussed above—the legal and political
differences across vertical and horizontal jurisdictions in the United
States—which lends itself to a more nuanced analysis.

I. Commons Resources and Management
A. Tragedy of the Commons
8

9

Garrett Hardin’s oft-cited Tragedy of the Commons has had a
profound impact on the shape and structure of environmental policy. In
particular, Hardin’s article has proven to be the genesis of a body of
commons scholarship that has since evolved to inform key aspects of law
and policy, economics, political science, and a variety of other fields.
The Tragedy of the Commons describes a field open to herders of
cattle, each of whom is grazing in the pasture. This “commons” is “open
access,” with each relevant actor on the commons (or pasture) maintaining
the right to use the “commons resource” (or grass) as much as possible and
with no ability to exclude other actors from doing so. In the Tragedy of the
Commons, the open nature of the commons allows each herder to make a
“rational” calculation to continually add cattle to the herder’s respective
herd in an effort to maximize personal economic gain. Though each herder
gains the entire benefit of each additional animal, the negative cost of
overgrazing is spread among all herders—while the commons is open to
all, the system of natural capital present upon it is closed and limited. The
tragedy occurs when each herder determines that it is always in the
herder’s best interest to add more cattle, since individual returns will
always far outweigh individual costs. Eventually, without some

7. We do not use the term “uncommon” here to mean low frequency or rarity, but rather to
indicate that the two approaches we highlight—vertical regulatory coordination and horizontal selfcoordination—have nothing in common with each other, being on opposite ends of the commons
solution spectrum.
8. See Karlson “Charlie” Hargroves & Michael H. Smith, The Natural Advantage of
Nations: Business Opportunities, Innovation and Governance in the 21st Century 178 (2005)
(“Hardin’s paper is one of the most cited papers of the last 40 years.”).
9. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968).
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coordinating force arising either internally from the collection of
individuals or externally from an outside authority, each individual’s
exercise of rational self-interest results in overconsumption of the natural
capital and ultimately its complete and tragic elimination from the system.
B. Commons Resource Management, Traditional Natural Capital
Commons, and Climate Change
1.

Commons Resource Management

Commons scholars have settled on two key elements that define
commons resources: depletability and non-excludability. Robert Keohane
and Elinor Ostrom characterize commons resources as “depletable natural
or human-made resources from which potential beneficiaries are difficult
10
to exclude,” while Oran Young similarly describes them as resources
“used by a group of appropriators that is both non-excludable and
11
depletable.” Stated differently, commons resources are “natural or
human-made resources in which (a) exclusion is non-trivial (but not
12
necessarily impossible) and (b) yield is subtractable.” As a simple
illustration, the grass resource consumed by one herder is no longer
available to others (depletable), and it is very difficult to exclude any one
herder from consuming the resource (non-excludable).
The environment within which commons resources exist is known as
13
a “resource system,” which is comprised of “resource units,” which are
14
“what individuals appropriate or use from resource systems.” Resource
15
units “are not subject to joint use or appropriation,” meaning that
appropriators can exclude other appropriators from the resource unit
itself. Rather, the non-excludability requirement for a commons resource
means it is exceedingly difficult to exclude other appropriators from the

10. Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction, in Local Commons and Global
Interdependence 1, 13 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995). Duncan Snidal asserts that
commons analysis “focuses on the provision and appropriation of goods that are not joint in
consumption (like private goods) but where exclusion is difficult (like public goods). Standard cases
are natural resources, like forests or water, where the quantity available is less than the desired
consumption of potential appropriators.” Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors,
Heterogeneity and Institutions, in Local Commons and Global Interdependence, supra, at 47, 50.
11. Oran R. Young, The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships, in Local
Commons and Global Interdependence, supra note 10, at 27, 29.
12. Steven Hackett et al., Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution: Experimental
Evidence on Sharing Contracts, in Local Commons and Global Interdependence, supra note 10, at
93, 95.
13. Ostrom cites fishing grounds, groundwater basins, grazing areas, irrigation canals, bridges,
parking garages, mainframe computers, streams, lakes, oceans, and other bodies of water as examples
of “resource systems.” See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of
Institutions for Collective Action 30 (1990).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 31.
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resource system. As described in prior research, a fundamental
understanding of the relationship between a resource unit and the
resource system is important for arguments in this Article related to
scale, which depend a great deal upon how one defines both the resource
unit and the resource system. Here, for example, a resource unit may be
defined by private property, local, state, or national geopolitical
boundaries, and the resource system is the higher-level geopolitical
jurisdiction that contains those respective resource units.
Finally, the act of withdrawing resource units from a resource system
is the act of “appropriation,” while those who withdraw resource units
17
from a resource system are “appropriators.” Mechanisms aimed at
preventing tragic over-appropriation of commons resources historically
have taken one or a combination of three primary forms. On one end of
the spectrum is government regulation, whereby an external authority
mandates rules for herder appropriation of the resource and regulation
of how appropriation occurs. On the other end of the spectrum is
privatization, whereby an external authority establishes rules for “fencing”
the commons and allocating property rights. In this way, each herder is
thought to have a privatized interest in preserving the resource on a
specific and dedicated portion of property. Highlighting a third
mechanism, Ostrom argued that neither regulation nor privatization is a
necessary component of sustainable commons management. Ostrom
argued:
One set of advocates presumes that a central authority must assume
continuing responsibility to make unitary decisions for a particular
resource. The other presumes that a central authority should parcel out
ownership rights to the resource and then allow individuals to pursue
their own self-interests within a set of well-defined property rights.
Both centralization advocates and privatization advocates accept as a
central tenet that institutional change must come from the outside and
be imposed on the individuals affected. Despite sharing a faith in the
necessity and efficacy of “the state” to change institutions so as to
increase efficiency, the institutional changes they recommend could
18
hardly be further apart.

16. See Hudson, supra note 4.
17. See Ostrom, supra note 13, at 31. Ostrom gives numerous examples of appropriators, such as
herders, fishers, irrigators, commuters, and “anyone else who appropriates resource units from some
type of resource system.” Id.
18. Id. at 14. Furthermore, Ostrom argues that
[a]n assertion that central regulation is necessary tells us nothing about the way a central
agency should be constituted, what authority it should have, how the limits on its authority
should be maintained, how it will obtain information, or how its agents should be selected,
motivated to do their work, and have their performances monitored and rewarded or
sanctioned. An assertion that the imposition of private property rights is necessary tells us
nothing about how that bundle of rights is to be defined, how the various attributes of the
goods involved will be measured, who will pay for the costs of excluding nonowners from
access, how conflicts over rights will be adjudicated, or how the residual interests of the
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Ostrom argued that advocates of both privatization and government
regulation are “too sweeping in their claims,” and that “neither the state
nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain
19
long-term, productive use of natural resource systems.”
20
Invoking Thomas Hobbes, Ostrom challenged the idea that
government regulation—the “external Leviathan”—is the “only way” to
21
resolve commons problems, as has been argued by some scholars. Such a
presumption has led scholars to recommend that central governments
control most natural resource management within nations, whereby the
“central authority will decide who can use the meadow, when they can use
22
it, and how many animals can be grazed.” Yet central governments often
do not maintain sufficient information to estimate the carrying capacity of
commons resources or to design the appropriate penalties to induce
behavioral change and to implement sufficient monitoring and
enforcement. As a result, resource management policies are often
23
ineffective and result in continued resource degradation. It is perhaps no
surprise, then, that federal systems of decentralized resource governance
arose to cure central government deficiencies by harnessing the access to
information maintained by subnational governments and the
responsiveness of citizens more directly involved in resource appropriation
and management.
Ostrom also challenged arguments of other scholars that stringent
imposition of private property rights is the “only way” to prevent
24
commons tragedies. Privatization “would divide the meadow in half and
assign half of the meadow to one herder and the other half to the second
25
herder.” As Ostrom asserted, however, “each herder will be playing a
game against nature in a smaller terrain, rather than a game against
26
another player in larger terrain.” In other words, individuals may pit
themselves against natural capital on private properties, often tragically
27
appropriating it and replacing it with human-made capital, even if the
provision of private property rights allows them to exclude other
appropriators from the property. In addition, a variety of market failures

right-holders in the resource system itself will be organized.
Id. at 22.
19. Id. at 1.
20. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
21. See Ostrom, supra note 13, at 8.
22. Id. at 9.
23. See id. at 17.
24. See id. at 12.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Human-made capital includes “factories, buildings, tools, and other physical artifacts usually
associated with the term ‘capital.’” Robert Costanza & Herman E. Daly, Natural Capital and
Sustainable Development, 6 Conservation Biology 37, 38 (1992).
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and externalities, such as imperfect information, “free-riders,” transaction
costs, and collective action problems lead to continued environmental
28
destruction even in the presence of a private property rights system.
As an alternative to these two extremes, Ostrom put forth what might
be termed a “successful collective action model,” arguing that herders are
not inevitably locked into a tragic fate and that a variety of case studies
demonstrate successful collective action to protect resources in the absence
of private property rights or government regulation. Ostrom noted that
“the capacity of individuals to extricate themselves from various types of
29
dilemma situations varies from situation to situation” and that instead
“of presuming that some individuals are incompetent, evil, or irrational,
and others are omniscient, I presume that individuals have very similar
limited capabilities to reason and figure out the structure of complex
30
environments.” Ostrom and other commons scholars building on her
31
research have provided robust insights into the circumstances under
which groups of individuals have engaged in successful collective action to
sustainably manage resources in the absence of private property rights or
32
governmental regulatory intervention.

28. See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78
U. Colo. L. Rev. 533, 538 (2007). See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, The Land We Share: Private
Property and the Common Good (2003); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315
(1993).
29. Ostrom, supra note 13, at 14.
30. Id. at 25.
31. These circumstances include: (1) the boundaries of both the resource system and the parties who
may appropriate resources are clearly defined; (2) appropriation and provision rules match (or are
“congruent” with) local conditions, meaning rules restricting time, place, technology, and quantity of
resource units that may be appropriated are related to those conditions; (3) most all appropriators have
collective choice rights allowing them to participate in modifying operational rules; (4) monitors of rules
and behavior are accountable to appropriators or are appropriators themselves; (5) appropriators who
violate rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions; (6) adequate conflict-resolution mechanisms
are low-cost and may be accessed quickly; (7) the rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions
are not challenged by external governmental authorities; and (8) appropriative, monitoring, enforcement,
and conflict resolution activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. See id. at 90. An
article reviewing ninety-one empirical studies applying Ostrom’s design principles found that
the principles are well supported. The most trenchant critiques were abstract, rather than
empirical. This does not mean that the principles are complete; their incompleteness is the
most important empirical critique we found in the literature. Other factors such as the size
of user groups, differing types of heterogeneity within or between user groups, and the type
of government regime within which users operate are clearly important in many cases.
Michael Cox et al., A Review of Design Principles for Community-Based Natural Resource
Management, 15 Ecology & Soc’y 38, 52 (2010).
32. Such groups include communities managing meadows and forests in Torbel, Switzerland, and
Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan, as well as communities managing irrigation systems
in Valencia, Murica and Orihuela, and Alicante, Spain, and in the Philippines. See Ostrom, supra note
13, ch. 3. Importantly, many of Ostrom’s design principles “appear relevant to resolve problems of
international cooperation as well as those at a strictly local level.” Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 10,
at 2. Nonetheless, Ostrom’s examples currently remain a distinct minority of cases. As observed by
scholars, “[t]he real world commons problems that Ostrom studies usually involve repeated
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Traditional Natural Capital Commons and Climate Change

Commons analysis and application of the three commons solutions
outlined above have traditionally been applied to natural resources, as a
framework for assessing their management. Domestic and global fisheries,
groundwater aquifers, oil and gas resources, the atmosphere, wildlife, and
forests, just to name a few resources, have historically presented a variety
of commons problems. Of late, the attributes of the atmosphere that take
on commons characteristics have shifted. Air pollution is the traditional
conception of “atmosphere as a commons,” when polluters—much like
Hardin’s herders—appropriate the clean air resource and replace it with
pollution. Yet in modern times, climate change has given rise to new
commons attributes of the atmosphere, as aggregated sources of carbon
worldwide jeopardize an atmosphere that would otherwise adequately
33
regulate global temperatures over time.
A similar shift has taken place with forest resources, which are
increasingly recognized as a common-pool resource. Despite the fact that
forests may be anchored to the soil under the control of individual
property owners or governments, the aggregated role of forests
worldwide to act as a carbon sink and regulate the global atmosphere
make them virtually as fluid and unbounded as fish in the sea. With
nearly 20% of global carbon emissions resulting from forest degradation
and destruction on private and government regulated forests in recent
decades—an amount of carbon greater than that emitted by the
34
transportation sector each year —the forest resource is clearly a
common-pool resource whose proper management is crucial to
combating climate change. Even so, as noted earlier, these forests
resources, even in the United States, are threatened by increasing
urbanization and other pressures—with the projected disappearance of
13% of southeastern U.S. forests over the next fifty years providing only
35
one example. These threats largely result from a forest regulatory
framework that is inconsistent or even non-existent at the subnational
level, with extremely limited inputs at the federal level.
Wetlands provide another example of the carbon sequestration and
climate change mitigation potential of what increasingly may be
characterized as common-pool natural capital, notwithstanding private
property ownership or government jurisdictions. While conventional

interactions among a relatively small number of players who are able to develop subtle institutions for
monitoring and enforcing a degree of cooperation.” Theodore C. Bergstrom, The Uncommon Insight
of Elinor Ostrom, 112 Scandinavian J. Econ. 245, 246 (2010).
33. See generally Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and
Global Environmental Change, 20 Global Envtl. Change 550 (2010).
34. See Erin C. Myers Madeira, Policies to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation (REDD) in Developing Countries 8 (2008).
35. See supra note 3.
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wisdom may conceptualize tropical forest preservation as crucial to
natural capital-driven climate change mitigation, coastal wetlands in the
United States and elsewhere are equally if not more crucial. The
International Union for Conservation of Nature reports that coastal
wetlands sequester fifty times more carbon in their soil per unit of area
36
than tropical forests, and ten times more than temperate forests. In
other words, the preservation of a smaller area of coastal wetland
sequesters more soil carbon than the protection of a larger area of
tropical or temperate forests. Empirical studies in California and Florida
suggest that coastal wetlands offer excellent potential for carbon
sequestration since their continual accretion and burial of nutrient-rich
sediments causes them to accumulate carbon over longer time periods
37
and at higher rates than other ecosystems.
Even so, these wetlands are subject to tremendous threats—many of
which are related to development activities in the coastal zone guided
38
almost exclusively by subnational governments. Other threats come in
39
the form of industrial and energy development along the coast. Many, if
not a majority of the United States’ coastal wetland areas have already
40
been developed, with coastal wetland losses accelerating in recent years
in spite of a technical gain in wetlands in the United States on the
41
whole. The state of Louisiana loses 6600 acres of coastal wetlands a
42
year, while coastal watersheds in the Great Lakes, Atlantic Ocean, and
43
Gulf of Mexico lost 59,000 acres each year from 1998 to 2004. While the
federal government does maintain a wetland fill permitting program
under § 404 of the Clean Water Act, it approves a vast majority of
wetland fill permits, while subnational governments, as with forests, are
largely failing to preserve these resources.

36. See IUCN, The Management of Natural Coastal Carbon Sinks 49 (Dan Laffoley &
Gabriel Grimsditch eds., 2009).
37. See Joy B. Zedler & Suzanne Kercher, Wetland Resources: Status, Trends, Ecosystem Services,
and Restorability, 30 Ann. Rev. Env’t & Resources 39, 55 (2005); see also Gail L. Chmura et al.,
Global Carbon Sequestration in Tidal, Saline Wetland Soils, 17 Global Biogeochemical Cycles 22-1
(2003); A.H. Hussein et al., Modeling of Carbon Sequestration in Coastal Marsh Soils, 68 Soil Sci.
Soc’y Am. J., 1786, 1786–87 (2004).
38. See IUCN, supra note 36, at 8–9.
39. Coastal La. Ecosystem Assessment & Restoration (CLEAR), Reducing Flood Damage in
Coastal Louisiana: Communities, Culture and Commerce 2 (2006).
40. The United States as a whole has lost over half of its wetlands. See David Moreno-Mateos et
al., Structural and Functional Loss in Restored Wetland Ecosystems, 10 Pub. Libr. Sci. Biology 1, 1 (2012).
41. See generally Susan-Marie Stedman & Thomas E. Dahl, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric
Admin. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. & U.S. Dep’t of the Interior Fish & Wildlife Serv., Status and
Trends of Wetlands in the Coastal Watersheds of the Eastern United States 1998 to 2004 (2008).
42. Robert R.M. Verchick, Facing Catastrophe: Environmental Action for a Post-Katrina
World 19 (2010).
43. Stedman & Dahl, supra note 41, at 5.
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In addition to forests and wetlands, agriculture provides another
potentially significant carbon sink subject to commons dynamics. Even
though agricultural lands are privatized, individual herders, not
surprisingly, appropriate natural capital from their respective pastures
through the cultivation of the land. They do so, however, in a manner
with profound implications for the global climate commons. Their
actions can be either a great benefit to climate change mitigation, if
agricultural operations tip toward being a sink for greenhouse gases
(“GHGs”), or they can be a significant contributor to climate change if
agricultural operations tip toward being a source of carbon. Agriculture
is a significant source of global GHGs, accounting for about 10% to 12%
44
of annual global carbon emissions. Yet it also has the potential to
provide a significant GHG sink upon the appropriate adjustment of
agricultural operations and policies. The agricultural sector can sequester
large amounts of carbon in soil and crops after a variety of adjustments
in crop cultivation (rotation, tillage, adoption of organic practices, and
use of agro-forestry) and other management changes. Studies have
shown, however, that GHG sink potential in the agricultural sector is far
45
below the technical potential.
Despite the GHG sink potential of agriculture, governments at all
levels in the United States are doing very little to directly regulate and
46
ensure its use as a sink. The federal government maintains a variety of
incentive-based, voluntary subsidy and other programs that have impacts
on carbon sequestration, but these are necessarily limited in scope
47
(primarily by budgetary constraints) and breadth of impact. In addition,
the federal government maintains few prescriptions regulating
agriculture. Many federal statutes contain agricultural exemptions, while
others, like the Clean Water Act, do not regulate agricultural activities
traditionally considered to fall within the state governments’ land use
48
regulatory role, like nonpoint source water pollution. Subnational

44. Pete Smith et al., Agriculture, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 498 (Bert
Metz et al. eds., 2007).
45. Id. at 522.
46. Governments at all levels have taken steps to regulate some agricultural uses that have
indirect effects on GHG emissions and sinks. For example, many state and local governments regulate
the use of fertilizers and pesticides, several of which, if unregulated, would result in GHGs being
emitted directly into the atmosphere when the proper land conditions are not met. See, e.g., Minn.
Stat. § 103E.021 (2012) (limiting the use of certain fertilizers and manure in conservation grassed
buffer zones); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1427 (2010) (same).
47. Blake Hudson, Agriculture and Forestry, in Global Climate Change and U.S. Law
(Michael Gerrard & Jody Freeman eds., 2d ed. forthcoming 2013).
48. Robin Kundis Craig contends that Congress’ operation “within constitutional federalism
requirements” has caused it to miscalculate the constitutionality of direct federal regulatory inputs
into nonpoint pollution assumed to be the sole regulatory role of state and local governments. Robin
Kundis Craig, Local or National? The Increasing Federalization of Nonpoint Source Pollution
Regulation, 15 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 179, 179–81 (2000). Craig notes that “[c]omprehensive federal
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governments in the United States, on the other hand, maintain a wide
range of tools to regulate agricultural activities, particularly those related
to their police power to regulate land use activities. These governments
have passed urban growth boundaries, farmland preservation programs,
and large lot zoning statutes and ordinances to, for example, help directly
or indirectly preserve existing farmland. They have also utilized
agricultural zoning laws to regulate the when, where, and how of
49
agricultural production within a municipal unit. State governments also
retain the authority to regulate GHG emissions from agriculture, as well
as a variety of land use activities that can either act as source or sink of
carbon. Yet states “have generally refrained from regulating emissions
50
from any agricultural sources.” The states’ reluctance to prescriptively
regulate a variety of agricultural activities related to greenhouse gas
emissions leaves subsidy programs, tax policy, and market-driven
instruments as the primary means of shaping agricultural policy in the
context of climate change mitigation at both the federal and state levels.
As a result, it is perhaps no surprise that GHG sink activity in the
agricultural sector is far below its technical potential.
Ultimately, commons resources like forests, wetlands, and
agricultural lands are subject to traditional commons management
mechanisms such as private property and government regulation, yet
remain in a tragic plight—with stark implications for climate change.
This evidence supports the view that some critical components of the
commons resource management mechanisms the United States maintains
are malfunctioning. The inadequate balance of private property rights
and government regulation in managing resources crucial to combating
climate change across scales in the United States supports this Article’s
deconstruction of the nested commons in order to determine where these
malfunctions are taking place and how they might be corrected.
C. New Commons Resources and the Nested Governance Commons
Commons scholarship has expanded over time beyond the natural
environment to include a variety of non-traditional commons resources,
such as medical care, parking spaces, sidewalk vending, knowledge,
51
government budgets, silence, email inboxes, and presidential primaries.
regulation of nonpoint source pollution would thus arguably engage the federal government in land
use regulation—a type of regulation historically viewed as belonging almost exclusively to more local
levels of government,” and that “because of federalism restrictions, Congress cannot and has not
forced states to assume any regulatory burden with respect to nonpoint sources of water pollution.
Therefore, regulation of nonpoint source polluters is left largely to states’ individual regulatory
discretion.” Id. at 182, 186.
49. See Donald B. Pedersen & Keith G. Meyer, Agricultural Law in a Nutshell 356–61 (1995).
50. Viney P. Aneja et al., Effects of Agriculture upon the Air Quality and Climate: Research,
Policy, and Regulations, 43 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 4234, 4236 (2009).
51. For discussion of commons scholarship expanding to include presidential primaries, see
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Each of these newly categorized commons resources is subject to
rivalrous depletion by non-excludable appropriators, even though they
do not arise out of traditional, natural environment commons.
New Commons scholarship continues to expand, with recent research
52
describing how a governance structure itself can operate like a commons.
This concept is further expanded in the next Part, detailing how the federal
system of government may operate as a commons, primarily through the
allocation of governance authority among levels of government and
53
between branches of government. One of the roles that our federal
system of government has increasingly assumed, of course, is the
management of natural resource commons. Yet in our federal system,
more natural capital governance authority maintained by the federal
government may mean less for subnational governments, and vice versa. If
subnational governments, such as the fifty states, maintain more or nearly
exclusive authority then, by virtue of the governance structure those
entities are allowed to “roam” on the commons freely: appropriating
natural capital without federal coordination and perhaps without
coordinating with each other to ensure non-tragic resource management.
We see this in the context of land-use planning at the subnational level
and the resultant urban sprawl that is threatening natural capital crucial
to climate change. In this way, our federal system of government is a
nested governance commons that overlays natural resource commons.
Stated differently, natural resource commons are embedded within the
governance framework that sets the rules for appropriation and
management of those resources—a framework that itself may be
segmented in a way that tracks a commons. Ultimately, though private
property rights and government regulation are the tools used to manage
natural resources in the United States (or, traditional commons resources),
the federal governance structure within which they are embedded and
implemented may also be considered a new commons, as further detailed
in the next Part.

Brigham Daniels, Governing the Presidential Nomination Commons, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 899 (2010).
52. See Brigham Daniels & Blake Hudson, Our Constitutional Commons (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with authors). Daniels and Hudson describe (in part) how the Constitution establishes a
governance structure that takes on dimensions of a commons resource. Institutions, like federal systems
of government, allocate rules of governance among levels of government and between branches of
government, and allocate citizen rights through rivalrous jockeying over constitutional resources by nonexcludable citizens, states, executives, courts, and legislatures—creating what Daniels and Hudson term a
“constitutional commons.” See id. The component of the constitutional commons that allocates rules of
governance for private property among local, state, and national governments may be described more
generally as a nested governance commons across levels of government.
53. See id.
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II. Denesting the Federal Governance Commons:
The Legal Theoretical Framework
Natural resource commons are multi-scalar, in that resources are
contained in vertically and horizontally structured governance scales that
include a complex web of appropriators within each scale and across
scales. For example, forests are horizontally scaled across the geopolitical
boundary between the United States and Canada and vertically scaled
within each of those nations across national and subnational government
jurisdictions and private properties—with numerous entities playing a
role in appropriating those resources. But it is important to ask: Precisely
what is it that makes natural resources multi-scalar? It is not the natural
environment itself, at least in the primary sense used by governance
54
scholars, since the biota, absent artificial human divisions and
consumptive influence, is interconnected in a way that creates a highly
functional, integrated, unified, and natural scale globally. What makes
natural resources multi-scalar are the artificial geopolitical boundaries and
corresponding allocations of governance authority creating the governance
systems within which natural resources are embedded. This is what
commons scholars mean when they refer to the potential to scale up
55
analysis of local commons to the national and international scales.
There are very few open pastures remaining, with governments and
private property owners controlling most natural resources worldwide.
And aside from some ocean resources, open-access properties that remain
are embedded within some country with ultimate governmental authority
over them if they choose to exercise it. In this way we can see that it is the
intersection between natural resource commons and the nested
governance commons where modern resource commons problems arise.
To understand the complexity and dynamism of the nested
governance commons, it is important to first break it down to its
constituent parts. This necessitates analyzing each “nest” as a horizontal
construct within the vertically nested governance commons, as well as
analyzing the relationship of each nest with the successive nest up or down
the vertical scale. Within each nest there are two primary components that
intersect to determine whether and how natural resources are managed on
private or government-owned lands: (1) legal authority of horizontal or
vertical governments to enact regulatory policies, and (2) political action
on the part of those governments to actually do so. These components
intersect in a variety of scenarios, the most notable of which we have
attempted to describe below. (This is, however, by no means an exhaustive

54. Of course, the global environment is made up of thousands of vastly different ecosystems that
operate on different biological scales, but the natural function of ecosystems is not scaled vertically in
the sense that scholars use to describe multi-scalar governance and management of resources.
55. See generally Local Commons and Global Interdependence, supra note 10.
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list.) In addition, the scenarios discussed below are applied throughout the
remainder of this Article to the U.S. federal system, though they could
certainly be applied to other federal systems of government.
To begin, let us consider scenarios that avoid natural capital
tragedies because, first, there are no legal, institutional barriers to natural
capital management. Second, natural capital tragedies are avoided under
these scenarios because horizontal or vertical entities, or both, have
exercised their legal authority to sustainably manage natural capital.
Management of natural capital resources within each nest may not result
in tragedy if at least one of five scenarios manifests (depicted as “NT”
[non-tragic] in Figure 2A below):
NT-1)

NT-2)

NT-3)

NT-4)

NT-5)

Higher levels of government have the legal authority to
vertically regulate the resource and exercise that authority
through political action, while entities at the lower level lack
56
the legal authority to horizontally coordinate.
Higher levels of government lack the legal authority to
vertically regulate the resource, but entities at the lower level
have the legal authority to horizontally coordinate and
undertake horizontal self-coordination through political action.
Higher levels of government have the legal authority to
vertically regulate the resource and exercise that authority
through political action, and entities at the lower level have the
legal authority to horizontally coordinate, but they do not
57
exercise that authority through political action.
Higher levels of government have the legal authority to
vertically regulate the resource, but fail to exercise that
authority through political action, and entities at the lower
level have the legal authority to horizontally coordinate and
undertake horizontal self-coordination through political action.
Higher levels of government have the legal authority to
vertically regulate the resource and exercise that authority
through political action, and entities at the lower level have the
legal authority to horizontally coordinate and also undertake
58
horizontal self-coordination through political action.

56. Lower levels of government may lack legal authority to horizontally coordinate because
higher-level governments have preempted them from doing so or have simply not granted them
authority to do so, or due to a number of other reasons outside the scope of this Article.
57. As discussed in more detail below, for purposes of this Article we refer to the failure to take
political action as meaning either the failure to exercise legal authority at all, or the failure to exercise
that authority in a way that resolves the commons dilemma.
58. An NT-5 scenario is consistent with recent calls for legal authority and political action at all
levels of government to address natural capital dilemmas—a type of federalism termed “dynamic
federalism,” whereby legal authority at any level of government is not impeded by other levels of
government or principles of constitutional law. Hari M. Osofsky has promoted “diagonal federalism”
strategies that “incorporate key public and private actors at different levels of government (the vertical
piece) and within each level of government (the horizontal piece) simultaneously in order to create
needed crosscutting interactions.” Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change:
Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 237, 241 (2011). For other examples
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Figure 2A

advocating a dynamic regulatory approach to natural capital management, see Dilemmas of Scale in
America’s Federal Democracy (Martha Derthick ed., 1999); Barry G. Rabe, Statehouse and
Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy 1–37 (2004); David E.
Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce Technological Change,
50 Ariz. L. Rev. 835 (2008); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 863 (2006);
Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from
Coordination, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 1185 (2008); Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic
Governance: The Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 Emory L.J. 1 (2007); Robert B. Ahdieh,
When Subnational Meets International: The Politics and Place of Cities, States, and Provinces in the World,
102 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 339 (2008); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law in a Shrinking World: The
Interaction of Science and Technology with International Law, 88 Ky. L.J. 809 (2000); Kirsten H. Engel,
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 Emory L.J. 159 (2006); Kirsten
Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to
Address a Global Problem and What Does this Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 Urb.
L. 1015 (2006) [hereinafter Engel, State and Local Climate Changes Initiatives]; David R. Hodas, State
Law Responses to Global Warming: Is It Constitutional to Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21 Pace
Envtl. L. Rev. 53 (2003); Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address Transitory and
Perpetual Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 1991 (2011); Alice Kaswan,
Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 253 (2009); Alice Kaswan, The Domestic
Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L.
Rev. 39 (2007); Barry G. Rabe, North American Federalism and Climate Change Policy: American State
and Canadian Provincial Policy Development, 14 Widener L.J. 121, 128–51 (2004); Judith Resnik, Law’s
Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 Yale
L.J. 1564 (2006); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 243
(2005); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural
Architectures, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 681 (2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions:
The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1701 (2008); Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The
Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 Ecology L.Q. 615 (2009).
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Correspondingly, natural capital commons tragedies can result when at
least one of four scenarios manifests (depicted as “T” [tragic] in
Figure 2B):
T-1)

T-2)

T-3)

T-4)

Higher levels of government have the legal authority to
vertically regulate the resource, but fail to exercise that
59
authority through political action, and entities at the lower
60
level lack the legal authority to horizontally coordinate.
Higher levels of government lack the legal authority to
vertically regulate the resource, and entities at the lower level
have the legal authority to horizontally coordinate, but it is not
exercised through political action.
Higher levels of government have the legal authority to
vertically regulate the resource, but fail to exercise that
authority through political action, and entities at the lower
level have the legal authority to horizontally coordinate, but
also fail to exercise that authority through political action.
Higher levels of government lack the legal authority to
vertically regulate the resource, and entities at the lower level
lack the legal authority to horizontally coordinate, failing to
produce either vertical regulatory coordination or horizontal
self-coordination. This scenario requires more thorough
explication, as it can play out in more complex ways. In the
United States, the Tenth Amendment makes it clear that legal
authority must reside with the federal or state governments—if
the federal government does not have legal authority to act,
then the states must have it, and vice versa. As a result, there
will not be a scenario where both the federal and state
governments in the United States do not maintain legal
authority to act. The T-4 scenario, however, could play out
quite frequently at state or local scales, as well as on the global
scale. If the federal government, for example, preempts state
authority to act, then neither the state nor the local
government maintains the legal authority to act, resulting in a
T-4 scenario at the state scale. Similarly, if the state
government preempts local authority to act, then a T-4
scenario could play out on the local scale, where the local
government actors and private property owners do not have
the legal authority to act. A T-4 scenario could also occur on
the global scale when the state government has the legal
authority to act and the federal government does not. In this
circumstance, restrictions on nested governance would be
operating in reverse, with the federal government not legally
permitted to horizontally coordinate with other nations in a
way that binds the states, which in turn prevents it from
61
authorizing a global body to vertically regulate via treaty.

59. Perhaps they do technically exercise that authority, but they do so in a way that does not
resolve the commons dilemma.
60. Again, due to preemption by higher-level governments, failure of higher-level governments to
grant legal authority, etc.
61. But see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 210–13 (1942) (holding that state laws, and
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Figure 2B

Before moving to a discussion of the global, national, state, and local
scales within which these scenarios play out and are nested, we should
pause a moment to provide three clarifications of this legal authority/
political action framework. First, though unlikely from a practical
perspective, theoretically a tragedy could be avoided within a given nest
even in the absence of either vertical or horizontal legal authority or
political action. In this situation, a critical mass of entities within each nest
could altruistically, but individually, act against perceived self-interest by
limiting their own use of the resource—but they would not do so in
presumably local laws, are invalid when conflicting with an international treaty).
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coordination with others, nor would they be directed by higher-level
governments. This Article is not concerned, however, with the coincidental
de facto coordination of separate actors, but rather with the institutional
and legal mechanisms that are needed horizontally or vertically to avoid
commons resource tragedies.
Second, this Article is concerned somewhat quantitatively with whether
commons management institutions are or are not in place and whether
there are legal barriers to such institutions, rather than with a qualitative
analysis of policy. As a result, the scenarios presented in this Article are
focused primarily on the issue of legal authority, though political action is
certainly a necessary component of proper commons resource management
both vertically and horizontally. Indeed, we do not suggest that simply
maintaining adequate legal authority will result in sustainable
decisionmaking and the proper government exercise of that authority,
whether vertically or horizontally. For example, there could be authority at
the higher level of government that is acted upon through vertical
regulatory action, but in a way that does not address the resource
management issues and that may even exacerbate the commons
conditions—i.e., bad policy.
Nonetheless, a necessary precursor to efficacious political action is
whether proper institutions are in place to legally facilitate that political
will in the first instance. This is why we necessarily presume for the
purposes of conveying the theoretical framework that if legal authority
exists and political action is taken in the NT scenarios above, then the
resulting policy resolves the commons dilemma. In the real world, we
understand that policy actions may be taken but not be efficacious. For
this reason, in the T scenarios dealing with preemption, for example, we
do make some qualitative observations—only in furtherance of the
framework—noting that legal authority may exist at a higher level of
government and may be acted upon, but in a way that does not resolve
the commons dilemma. We make this observation in the preemption
context merely because in the absence of preemption, the lower-level
government might be able to resolve said dilemma more effectively than
the higher-level government. So, to provide a clearer conception of the
framework, we are using the efficacy of political action very much like 1s
and 0s in binary code—either political action at that level of government
resolves the commons dilemma or it does not. Given the complexities of
assessing the relative success of policy, our model is purposefully lacking
in analysis of policy sufficiency.
Third and finally, as indicated earlier, this Article purposefully and
over-simplistically discusses these scales in relative isolation, leaving the
full complexity of cross-cutting scalar interactions to future research. One
of the reasons scalar analysis is so complex is because a degree of “scale
jumping” may occur, as represented by the T-4 scenario above. In part, the
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Constitution dictates how these scale-jumping interactions occur and acts
62
as a gatekeeper by identifying what natural capital resources will become
the subject of a legal authority dispute on the global, national, state, or
local governance commons. For example, if the Constitution grants the
federal government authority to regulate certain resources all the way
down to private individuals, then the federal government may exercise
that authority, leading to an NT scenario; or it may preempt state, local,
or private action, creating either an NT or T scenario, depending on
whether Congress crafts policy addressing the commons dilemma or not;
or the federal government may operate concurrently with entities across
those lower scales, leading to an NT or T scenario, depending on whether
Congress, states, local governments, or private actors craft policies
addressing the commons dilemma.
On the other hand, if the Constitution does not grant Congress the
legal authority to regulate at the state scale and on down, then state
constitutional law and legislation become the gatekeeper and determine
the ultimate outcome of a variety of T or NT commons management
scenarios at those scales. In the same way, lack of national authority in the
U.S. Constitution can affect T or NT scenarios at the global level, since
entities at the state or local scales may impede the ability of the national
government to participate in global scale governance arrangements to
address commons problems. Furthermore, the coordinated actions of
every private property owner on the earth, theoretically and however
unlikely, could resolve the commons dilemma across every higher scale—
jumping from the lowest scale to the highest in resolving the problem.
Similarly, a global arrangement successfully negotiated and successfully
implemented in every country on the globe could compel actors at all
lower scales to address the commons dilemma—thus jumping from the
highest scale to the lowest. And there are a variety of permutations of
scale jumping in between. The reality is that these types of cross-cutting
interactions do not occur within only these two dimensions of vertical
and horizontal. Rather, they occur in different ways across different
horizontal jurisdictional and geographic lines. It is this aspect of nested
governance commons that will be further analyzed in our future
research. Yet we acknowledge here that we are well aware of this
complexity.
We have now established the basic operation of each nest within a
governance commons, and how each nest may result in tragedy
depending on the presence or absence of legal authority and political
action both vertically and horizontally. However, there are multiple nests
scaled vertically and horizontally in the United States within which
natural capital commons are embedded. So, to gain a clearer and more

62. See generally Hudson, supra note 4.
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precise conception of the nested commons in the United States, we can
describe each nest as one of four, scaled from units as small as private
properties to the largest unit we can assess, the globe. As described
above and further detailed in the Subparts below, the legal entrenchment
of commons at each scale can arise out of very different legal
authority/political action scenarios, which are in turn determined by
matters of simple geopolitics (as in the case of the global commons),
constitutional law (as in the case of the national and state scale
commons), or legislative preemption (as in the case of some national,
state, and local scale commons). On any individual scale, as depicted in
Figure 3, a natural capital commons may occur (notwithstanding the
overarching governance commons), and each level may look like the
following:
(1) In the absence of vertical inputs by a global governance
arrangement or horizontal self-coordination among groups of
nations, national governments may act as individual herders on
the natural capital “pasture” that is the globe. The resource unit is
natural capital within a single nation, while the resource system is
global natural capital.
(2) In the absence of vertical inputs by the federal government or
horizontal self-coordination with each other, state governments
may act as individual herders on the natural capital “pasture”
defined by national jurisdictional boundaries. The resource unit is
natural capital within a single state, while the resource system is
natural capital within the collection of local governments that
make up the state.
(3) In the absence of vertical inputs from state governments or
horizontal self-coordination with each other, local governments
may act as individual herders appropriating natural capital from
the “pasture” defined by state jurisdictional boundaries. The
resource unit is natural capital within a single local government,
while the resource system is natural capital within the collection of
local governments that make up the state.
(4) In the absence of vertical inputs from local governments or
horizontal self-coordination with each other, private property
owners act as individual herders appropriating natural capital
from the “pasture” defined by local government jurisdictional
boundaries. The resource unit is natural capital on private
property, while the resource system is natural capital within the
collection of private properties that exist within local government
63
boundaries.

63. This Article breaks down local governments on the basic line between state level governments
and general purpose incorporated subdivisions that are self-governed, including cities, towns, villages,
counties (boroughs and parishes), but not special purpose or quasi-public entities (such as housing
authorities). Obviously, depending on jurisdiction, there may be towns or cities embedded within
townships embedded within counties, and so on and so forth. But the basic operation of the nest is the
same, and what we call “local governments” suffice for the time being as covering all the different
categories and subcategories of sub-state actors that may be found.
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Figure 3

While each level in isolation may constitute a typical natural resource
commons, whereby individual appropriators appropriate resource units
from the resource system, it is the integration of each scale within a federal
system of government that creates multi-scalar natural resource
management issues. Stated differently, it is the synergy between the
natural environment and the system of governance designing rules for its
management that presents the complete picture of the commons. In this
way, federal systems of government can operate as a nested governance
commons that overlays the natural environment—thus adding another
layer of complexity to the management approaches needed to address
climate change.
A. Global Governance Commons
On the global scale, nations are the individual actors appropriating
natural capital resource units from the global commons. In this way, we
can look at the legal policies of each nation regarding climate regulating
natural capital protection as a representation of either rational or
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irrational herder mentality on the global commons. Individual nations
may act alone to curb emissions or establish carbon sinks in forests,
wetlands, and agriculture. Yet there are strong disincentives from doing so,
not the least of which is that other nations will continue to grow their own
GHG-based economies by free riding on the GHG emissions limitationsink preservation efforts of others. So to achieve the most viable climate
change response on the global scale, individual nations must either
cooperatively and horizontally coordinate with each other, agreeing to
domestically adjust land use, forest, wetland, agricultural, or other
resource policies crucial to combatting climate change, or they must cede
sovereignty to an international treaty or other protocol establishing rules
of governance that will vertically coordinate those activities through
standards set at the international level and implemented by nations.
The global governance commons has the potential to devolve into a
tragedy because—absent a legally binding treaty or other arrangement—
there is no vertical legal authority at the global level to coordinate the
activities of nations engaged in natural capital appropriation, and therefore
whether a natural capital commons exists depends entirely on the
individual (or incidental collective) political action of nations to harness
their authority for natural capital management. At first glance it might
appear that horizontal self-coordination among nations and nations
coming together to craft a global vertical regulatory structure are one and
the same, since the creation of vertical regulatory structure at the global
level obviously requires horizontal coordination. Yet nations can go about
crafting global resource management regimes in different ways.
For instance, nations might cede all or a degree of sovereignty over
domestic resource management to an international body that crafts rules
for nations to implement domestically, which results in more direct and
64
robust vertical authority. Or perhaps rules are developed directly by
nations engaged in protocol negotiation, and any nation who wishes to be
a part of the protocol, at the present or in the future, must abide by those
rules and standards. On the other hand, individual nations may not cede
rulemaking authority to an international body or an international protocol,
but may agree to horizontally coordinate with other nations to utilize
domestic rule making, with a degree of flexibility, to meet certain resource
management targets. The treaty may still be binding, as with a vertical
regulatory structure, but in a true horizontal collaboration the individual

64. This mode of vertical regulatory coordination at the international level is termed an
“international delegation,” defined as “a grant of authority by two or more states to an international body
to make decisions or take actions.” Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International
Delegation, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1, 3 (2008); see Neil S. Siegel, International Delegations and the
Values of Federalism, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 93, 93 n.1 (2008) (“[I]nternational delegations take
many different forms, leaving nations and subnational units of nations (for example, U.S. states) with
varying degrees of regulatory control regarding the subject matter of the delegation.”).
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nations—and not a third party—are responsible for monitoring,
sanctioning, and adjudicating disputes regarding other nations’
appropriation of the resource.
In addition, horizontal governance at the international level can occur
in a variety of other ways that are not driven by global standards or targets.
Horizontal collective action may involve far fewer nations than would a
legally binding global governance regime, as a handful of nations may
come together to craft rules for localized governance problems that cross
only some national jurisdictional boundaries. The United States and
Mexico coordinating access to Colorado River resources or the United
States and Canada coordinating management of North American
65
migratory birds would be examples. Even though vertical regulatory
coordination and horizontal self-coordination at the global level can be
differentiated in some ways, at some point the two begin to merge due to
the ceiling that the globe places on governance: Unlike at lower levels of
government, the vertical and horizontal actors on the global scale are on
the same plane.
The presence of a global governance arrangement that establishes
binding rules at the international level can result in proper commons
resource management at the national scale, even if nations are not
individually engaged in domestic rule creation (absent the global push)
due to collective action, free rider, or other commons problems. This
might be characterized as NT-3 in Figure 2B, at least in part. Yet, since
ceding authority to an international body requires some degree of
horizontal collective action, it might also be characterized in part as an
NT-5 scenario. This is where the merger described above becomes
apparent. Similarly, in the absence of rules arising out of an international
body and implemented through domestic law, nations may choose to
harness their domestic authority to craft their own rules aimed at hitting
a resource management target and therefore manage natural capital in a
non-tragic way (scenario NT-2). On the other hand, the lack of a global
governance arrangement can devolve into a tragedy if countries do not
individually take political action pursuant to their legal authority
(scenario T-2). Or, perhaps a state or provincial government has the
constitutional authority to act and the federal government does not,
which results in the federal government not being legally permitted to
horizontally coordinate with other nations and in turn prevents it from
authorizing a global body to vertically regulate via treaty (scenario T-4).

65. We also recognize that a vertical regulatory regime could exist among a handful of nations
where those nations cede authority to a third party or newly created entity. See, e.g., Council of Great
Lakes Governors, The Great Lakes Charter: Principles for the Management of Great Lakes Water
Resources, Feb. 11, 1985, at 1; Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to
Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 36 Stat. 2448 (1909); The
Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
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Ultimately, the global governance commons exists merely as a matter
of geopolitics. There is no global constitution that may be amended to
grant global regulatory authority to a global congress or other legislative
body. There is also no global enforcement mechanism to ensure
compliance, short of military action. This is in sharp contrast to the
deference that subnational governments in the United States, for example,
maintain for national authority—even if initially defiant, states will
ultimately comply with federal mandates if upheld as constitutional in the
courts, even if the National Guard must intervene. In contrast,
international law relies solely on the political action of nations to selfregulate natural capital appropriation, voluntarily coordinate with other
nations to do so through global agreements on targets, or voluntarily
relinquish authority and at least some degree of sovereignty to meet
standards set at the international level. As a result, depletable global
natural capital is subject to rivalry by non-excludable nations, none of
which may be legally excluded from appropriating the resource unit of
natural capital over which they maintain control from the global resource
system. In this way, the global governance commons operates very much
like a national governance commons wherein the national government
maintains no constitutional authority to coordinate subnational natural
capital appropriation.
B. National Governance Commons
At the national scale, the commons dilemma shifts, with the group of
rational, self-interested actors changing from national governments to state
governments. State governments become herders on the national
commons, and avoiding a tragedy of the commons requires selfcoordination among the states or vertical coordination arising from federal
government regulation.
In the United States, natural capital commons are subject to private
property rights or government regulation, and most frequently both.
Management of these resources takes place within a federal system of
government that contains designed, vertical, multi-scalar divisions of
governance authority. The federal form of governance in the United States
maintains dimensions of a commons that currently manifest in the text of
the Constitution and, as described by recent research, one of these
dimensions consists of rules of governance related to the allocation and
division of governance authority between branches of government or
66
between levels of government. This allocation is in a constant state of
rivalry, as demonstrated by two examples in particular: the continued
wrangling over the scope of federal authority under the Commerce Clause

66. See generally Daniels & Hudson, supra note 52.
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and the related, subsidiary issue of complete preemption by the federal
government of subnational regulatory authority.
Regarding the scope of federal authority under the Commerce
Clause, more authority granted to subnational governments means less
for the federal government and vice versa (meaning there is rivalry over
a depletable resource). For example, state governments may wish to
maintain exclusive regulatory authority over areas traditionally governed
solely by states. So any expansion of federal power that allows either
concurrent regulation by the federal government, or perhaps even
preemption, results in a depletion of state government authority to
exclusively regulate (or authority to see those activities remain
unregulated, as they may prefer). In addition, it is very difficult to
exclude any commons user (the executive, legislature, judiciary, states,
and citizenry) from accessing the institutions that shape the
appropriation of that authority over time. In this way, the federal system
can be seen as a governance commons that overlays the natural resource
commons it was intended to govern.
So let us place the national governance commons in the context of
the scenarios discussed above. The presence of federal legal authority
over subnational resource appropriation (via the Commerce Clause) can
result in proper commons resource management at the national scale if
the national government exercises political action pursuant to that
authority to coordinate subnational activities in the absence of
subnational action (scenario NT-3), or completely in lieu of subnational
action through preemption (scenario NT-1). Similarly, in the absence of
federal Commerce Clause authority, subnational entities may choose to
harness their authority to manage natural capital in a non-tragic way
(scenario NT-2), or they may do so when the federal government
maintains legal authority but chooses not to politically act (scenario NT4). Finally, both the federal and subnational governments may maintain
legal authority and both levels exercise that authority through political
67
action to properly manage resources (scenario NT-5). On the other
hand, even if the federal government maintains Commerce Clause
authority, a tragedy may result if it chooses not to exercise its authority
through political action to coordinate subnational activities at the same
time that it also preempts the legal authority of subnational governments
to manage the resource (scenario T-1). Similarly, the lack of federal
Commerce Clause authority can divulge into a tragedy if subnational
governments do not act politically on their legal authority (scenario T-2).
Finally, a tragedy may result if both the national and subnational
governments maintain legal authority, but each fails to exercise that
authority through political action to manage the resource (scenario T-3).

67. See supra note 58.
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Ultimately, it is the Constitution’s arguable depletion of federal
authority over some resource management that legally entrenches a
constitutional governance commons scenario. The Constitution grants
primary regulatory authority over certain types of natural capital
appropriation to a vast quantity of subnational governments. Thus, the
depletable national natural capital is subject to rivalry by non-excludable
subnational governments, none of which may be legally excluded from
appropriating the resource unit of natural capital over which they maintain
control from the national resource system (scenario T-2). Unless
subnational actors work together to craft sustainable resource
management rules (scenario NT-2), there is no higher level of government
with authority to coordinate their activities. It is this vertical overlay of
potentially rational governance authority that facilitates the potential
rationality of natural capital appropriators along the horizontal plane.
Managers of the governance commons (Congress, the judiciary, the
executive, the states, and the citizenry) can always seek to adjust the
constitutional structure to redress a legally entrenched commons.
Congress could pass a statute claiming authority over natural resources,
the regulation of which was previously considered the sole sphere of
state governance authority—no legislator is excluded from proposing
such a statute and legislators do so in rivalry with those opposing that
appropriation or reallocation of governance authority (which would, of
course, deplete, at least to an extent, the discretionary governance
authority of the states). A president may then veto the statute, or in the
alternative sign the legislation to ensure its passage, weighing in either
against or in agreement with the new appropriation of governance
authority. Any citizen or state that opposes the statute may lodge a
challenge against its constitutionality, in rivalry with those citizens or
states that would see governance authority appropriated in exactly the
manner Congress chose to appropriate it. But unless managers of the
governance commons seek to adjust the governance structure in this way,
natural resources will remain embedded on a horizontal plane within a
vertical governance structure that legally insulates levels of government
from inputs by other levels.
Similarly, preemption by the federal government of subnational
regulatory authority also may or may not result in commons tragedies.
Under this scenario, the federal government forbids subnational
governments from exercising what would otherwise be their
constitutional authority over natural capital appropriation. It may be that
this supplanting of subnational control results in better resource
management, as is arguably the case with certain federal preemptive
provisions in the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act that supplant state
or local rules that may conflict with the federal scheme (scenario NT-1).
Yet under other scenarios federal preemption may result in a supplanting
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of state or local authority in a way that prohibits the development of more
optimal natural capital appropriation measures (scenario T-1), as is
arguably the case in the context of mobile source regulation under the
Clean Air Act. In the context of climate change, there are a number of
examples in which state governments sought to address climate-changerelated issues and were preempted by federal law, contributing to
68
potentially tragic consequences in the aggregate. This result is
represented by T-1 in Figure 2B, whereby subnational governments do not
choose to rush toward commons tragedies, but are actually legally required
to act in a rivalrous manner in appropriating depletable resource units of
natural capital from the national commons.
C. State Governance Commons
As the commons dilemma shifts from the national to state scale, the
group of rational, self-interested actors changes from state governments
to local governments. On the state commons, state governments, which
constituted the potential herders on the national scale, are transformed
into the vertical regulatory authority. Local governments assume the role
of potential herders, seeking to appropriate natural capital by growing
local economies, generating local revenues, increasing the tax base, and
69
so on, and doing so by competing with other local governments. This
competition, a form of “race-to-the-bottom” that can lead to lax land-use
or forest-management standards, for example, results in potentially tragic
mismanagement of climate-crucial natural capital in the absence of
horizontal self-coordination among local governments or vertical
coordination arising from state government regulation.
As the commons dilemma shifts from the national to the state scale,
the tussle over legal authority also shifts to a battle between state and local
governments. The outcome of this tussle is determined almost entirely by
70
state constitutional and statutory law. Unlike state governments, local

68. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004) (holding
that the Clean Air Act preempted state standards pertaining to new motor vehicle and new motor
vehicle engine emissions); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, No. CV F 04-6663 AWILJO,
2007 WL 135688 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2007) (holding that the Clean Air Act preempted state efforts to
reduce global warming pollution). But see Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie,
508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007) (holding that Vermont’s GHG regulations were not preempted).
69. A survey of recent scholarship reveals several articles applying a Tragedy of the Commons
analysis to local governments, including Thomas Gremillion, Setting the Foundation: Climate Change
Adaptation at the Local Level, 41 Envtl. L. 1221 (2011) (climate change); Emily C. Powers, Fracking
and Federalism: Support for an Adoptive Approach That Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory
Commons, 19 J.L. & Pol’y 913 (2011) (hydrofracking); Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry’s
LEED: Municipal Adoption of Private Green Building Standards, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 285 (2010) (land
use); Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 477
(2011) (renewables and urban sprawl).
70. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 174–80 (1907) (holding that local governments
are creatures of state law and that the U.S. Constitution does not protect local governments from state
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governments—the rational, self-interested actors on the state commons—
71
do not exist under the U.S. Constitution. Local governments are a legal
concept constructed out of state laws and they do not have inherent
72
regulatory authority under, or protected by, the Constitution. The
Constitution is relevant on the state scale, however, because local
governments have only that authority granted to them by the states. As a
result, the federal government assumption of legal authority to act on the
national scale, through preemption or otherwise, leaves state and local
governments without the legal authority to act (on either the national or
state scale)—avoiding a conflict between state and local governments at
the state scale (scenario T-4). Accordingly, avoiding a tragedy at the
state scale when the federal government is the sole governmental entity
with the legal authority to act on the national scale is dependent upon
federal action, as neither state nor local governments on the state scale
have the legal authority to act.
Alternatively, if on the national scale state governments maintain the
legal authority to act, either exclusively or shared with the federal
government, then the potential for a new struggle arises on the state
commons—a struggle between state and local governments. One example
of this struggle involves traditional notions of economic pressures as
described in the Tragedy of the Commons, whereby in the absence of state
government regulatory restrictions, local governments are engaged in the
oft-discussed race to the bottom phenomenon stemming from a
traditional, natural capital commons structure. The local governments are
believed to appropriate depletable and non-excludable resources in
competition with other local governments because of the economic
incentives in doing so. An alternative description of the commons dilemma
at the state scale is rooted in the legal pressures that actually influence
local governments to act rationally. These pressures are frequently
overlooked and stem from the fact that state law often compels local
governments to manage natural capital resources in a rational, and thus
potentially tragic, manner. In particular, local governments are often
prohibited from having extraterritorial impacts and are limited to
73
regulating solely within their borders. The combination of multi-

government intrusion). But see Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 482–86 (1968) (holding that a
state may not create a general purpose local government that apportions voting unequally in violation
of the Constitution); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346–48 (1960) (holding that the
Constitution protects individuals from state-created local self-government based on race).
71. See Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178.
72. See id.
73. Further discouraging local governments from taking sustainable action on common resources
are damage awards stemming from a finding of an impermissible extraterritorial impact. Cf. Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651–52 (1980) (“The knowledge that a municipality will be liable
for all of its injurious conduct, whether committed in good faith or not, should create an incentive for
officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their intended actions to err on the side of
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jurisdictional natural capital resources and limited local government
authority to regulate those resources creates inefficiencies that discourage
local governments from seeking innovative solutions to commons
74
challenges.
There are four potential legal scenarios within a state that inform
the nested governance commons and influence local government actors’
75
behavior on the state scale. The first stems from an early twentieth
76
century doctrine—Dillon’s Rule. Under this rule a local government
may act only if the action is expressly authorized by the state, is
incidental to an expressly stated authorization, or is “indispensable” to
77
performing the local government’s tasks. Further, any fair, reasonable
doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts
78
against the local government, and the power is denied. The remaining
three state legal scenarios informing the state governance commons are
commonly referred to as “home rule” laws. Home rule laws vary in the
amount of autonomy granted to local governments and come in three
79
80
forms: (1) legislative home rule, (2) imperio home rule, and (3) hybrid
81
legislative/imperio. Ultimately, all four of these legal scenarios—
Dillon’s Rule and the three types of home rule laws—limit local
government authority to some degree.
State preemption laws determine when a local government has
exceeded its legal authority under either Dillon’s Rule or the three types
of home rule authority, or when the state government has recaptured some
82
of that authority. Incorporated into the home rule and preemption
protecting citizens’ constitutional rights.”).
74. See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 446–62 (discussing state home rule and preemption laws and
the impact they have on local governments).
75. While we recognize that the probability of a state/local conflict and the outcome of that
conflict is heavily influenced by which of the four state legal scenarios is applicable, an in-depth
analysis of the four is beyond the scope of this Article, as we are establishing a foundation to
understand the state governance commons in which to later detail the nuances.
76. 1 John F. Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911).
77. Id. at 448–49. For an example of specific state authorization to act in a Dillon’s Rule state, see
Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2280 (1997) (enabling local zoning).
78. Dillon, supra note 76, at 452–53; see S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
58 S.W. 3d 706, 711 (Tenn. 2001) (applying a narrow view of local authority to act under Dillon’s
Rule); Early Estates, Inc. v. Hous. Bd. of Review of Providence, 174 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1961) (same).
79. See, e.g., Ark. Const. art. X, § 11.
80. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. III, § 5(a).
81. See, e.g., Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A.
82. The federal government may jump scales and also preempt a local law. We explore this jumping
of scales in more detail in a forthcoming companion piece. Here, we are establishing a foundation by
isolating the commons at each scale and its relationship to the direct and immediate horizontal and
vertical forces before exploring the dynamic and multi-layered interaction among scales and commons.
State preemption of a local law may occur in three ways: (1) conflict preemption, where there is a direct
conflict between the local ordinance and state law; (2) express preemption, where the state specifically
notes that it is preempting the subject matter; and (3) implied preemption, where the state preempts a
subject matter indirectly through prior actions, such as existing state legislation. See Talbot Cnty. v.
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analyses is an inquiry into whether a particular local action has an
83
impermissible extraterritorial impact. While state judicial interpretation
of when a local government is acting extraterritorially may differ, many
courts “use a finding of extraterritoriality as the basis for the conclusion
that [a local government] . . . has exceeded the [locality’s] . . . powers, or
84
has been preempted by the state legislature.”
The combination of Dillon’s Rule, home rule laws, and the judicial
interpretation of preemption laws coerces local governments to consider
only the impacts within their jurisdiction. Local government actors are at
a minimum encouraged, and at most legally compelled, not to consider
their externalities or to act “rationally,” resulting in a legally entrenched
85
commons. Because many natural capital resources are not confined to a
local government’s borders, any benefit that may stem from one local
government’s irrational protective action to preserve the resource can be
quickly lost. Therefore, the free-riding actions of neighboring jurisdictions
discourage “irrational” (responsible) horizontal management of commons
resources by those jurisdictions that would otherwise do so. Each locality
is therefore faced with both economic and legal pressure to adopt a
dominant strategy to benefit its inhabitants—internalizing those
benefits—while externalizing the costs to the other state common pool
86
actors. Each locality is reduced to competing with other localities for
the appropriation of natural resources, including those relevant to
climate change, such as forests, wetlands, and agricultural resources.
When more authority is assumed by state governments under strict
interpretations of Dillon’s Rule, home rule, and preemption laws, less
authority is granted to local governments and vice versa. In this way,
state constitutional and statutory provisions formulate a governance
commons that overlays the natural resource commons it was intended to
govern at the state level. The presence of Dillon’s Rule, home rule, and
preemption provisions over local resource appropriation can result in
proper commons resource management at the state scale if the state
government acts on its legal authority to regulate local activities
87
(scenario NT-1). State legislation pertaining to GHG reductions

Skipper, 620 A.2d 880, 886 (Md. 1993). See generally Goodell v. Humboldt Cnty., 575 N.W. 2d 486 (Iowa
1998) (holding county ordinances preempted by state legislature); Richard Briffault & Laurie
Reynolds, Cases and Material on State and Local Government 406–49 (7th ed. 2009).
83. See Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and the Region, 86 Denv. U. L. Rev.
1271, 1274 n.19 (2009) (citing Seigles, Inc. v. City of St. Charles, 849 N.E.2d 456, 458) (Ill. App. Ct. 2006))
(noting that the court called it “axiomatic” that a local government may not act outside its borders).
84. Id. at 1275.
85. See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 453–61.
86. This is not to suggest that local governments do not act in an individual altruistic or collective
manner. Despite the inefficiencies of acting alone, local governments have been a leading force to
address many common pool challenges. See id. at 466–68.
87. While local governments often control significant amounts of authority, particularly as related
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enacted in California, Oregon, and Washington represent examples
of the NT-1 scenario on the state scale, where state governments have
the legal authority to address climate change, take proactive political
action to do so, and presumably preempt any local action contrary to the
laws. Similarly, if a state constitution grants exclusive legal authority
91
through home rule or specific constitutional protections to local
governments to manage a resource, they may choose to harness their
collective action and coordinate with each other to manage the resource
92
in a non-tragic way (scenario NT-2).
Because a number of natural capital resources, such as wetlands,
forests, and agricultural resources, are simultaneously managed by state
and local governments, avoiding a tragedy of the commons could occur
when (a) the state vertically regulates local activities pertaining to the
resource in the absence of otherwise legitimate horizontal local
government political action (scenario NT-3); (b) local governments
horizontally coordinate in the absence of otherwise legitimate vertical state
political action (scenario NT-4); or (c) the state vertically regulates and
local governments horizontally coordinate (scenario NT-5). Local
government collaborations, such as C40 Cities Climate Leadership

to land use, waste management, and building codes, many cities do not have the home rule authority
to act (regardless of preemption laws) on a number of climate-crucial issues, such as energy and
agriculture, as reflected in scenario NT-1. See generally ARUP, Climate Action in Megacities: C40
Cities Baseline and Opportunities 4–11 (2011).
88. Assemb. B. 32, § 2, 2006 Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (Global Warming Solutions
Act) (establishing GHG reduction goals and a framework for achieving the goals).
89. H.B. 3543, 74th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007) (Climate Change Integration Act)
(setting specific GHG reduction goals for Oregon, including reducing GHG levels to 10% below 1990
levels by 2020 and to 75% below 1990 levels by 2050).
90. H.B. 2815, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008) (implementing GHG reduction strategies
through trading and vehicle miles traveled).
91. One of the most common specific state constitutional protections includes a state ban on special
commissions. See, e.g., S.D. Const. art. III, § 26 (prohibiting the state from delegating enumerated
functions over local governments to a special commission). Also common are state bans on special
legislation. See, e.g., Iowa Const. art. III, § 30 (prohibiting the state from passing enumerated special
laws).
92. We acknowledge that scenario NT-2 is less common than NT-3, -4, and -5, where state and local
governments share authority. In the majority of cases, courts readily recognize a state’s authority to
resume control granted to a local government. See People ex rel. Bernardi v. Highland Park, 520 N.E.2d
316, 322–23 (Ill. 1988) (holding that local government exceeded home rule authority when it hired a
contractor who paid less than state mandated prevailing wage); City of Des Plaines v. Chi. & N.W. Ry.
Co., 357 N.E.2d 433, 435–36 (Ill. 1976) (striking down a local law concerning noise pollution controls
because the city attempted to regulate noise from a train originating outside of its borders). However,
there are instances in which local governments have been authorized to act under general home rule
constitutional provisions or specific constitutional provisions that insulate them from state legislative—as
opposed to constitutional—action, thus resulting in scenario NT-2. See, e.g., Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton
Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 273–77 (Ill. 1984) (holding that a local law barring possession of handguns did not
exceed the village’s home rule power even though it would create a patchwork of different local laws);
Peters v. City of Springfield, 311 N.E.2d 107. 111–12 (Ill. 1974) (upholding a local ordinance setting a
mandatory retirement age for policemen and firemen below the state statute).
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Group, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and Union of the Baltic Cities,
represent horizontal collaborative attempts to avoid a tragedy relevant to
climate change at the state scale. When these attempts are coupled with
state legal authority but the state does not take political action, then an
NT-4 scenario can arise. Relatedly, when horizontal collaborations similar
to these are coupled with state legal authority and political action, an NT-5
scenario can arise and avoid the tragic overconsumption of resources.
Conversely, a tragedy may result if the state has not authorized local
governments to act, and the state fails to vertically regulate local activities
(scenario T-1). Over the past year, a T-1-like scenario has arisen in several
states over zoning and natural gas fracturing (or “fracking”). State laws in
Pennsylvania, for example, have attempted to carve out exceptions from
96
local zoning laws for various oil- and gas-related activities. In these
circumstances, local governments are powerless to protect the resource,
and the state has failed to take action to protect the resource (and in some
cases, such as fracking in Pennsylvania, has facilitated the consumption of
the resource). A tragedy may also occur if local governments are
authorized through home rule or specific enabling laws to manage a
resource, they fail to horizontally coordinate their activities, and the state
(1) fails to reclaim the legal authority from local governments (scenario T2); (2) is prohibited from reclaiming the authority by the state constitution
(scenario T-2); or (3) maintains concurrent legal authority and fails to
97
regulate through vertical state political action (scenario T-3).
At the state scale, a legally entrenched nested governance commons
results most often from a lack of state political action to vertically

93. See C40 Cities Climate Leadership Grp., http://www.c40cities.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2013)
(“Acting both locally and collaboratively, C40 Cities are having a meaningful global impact in
reducing both greenhouse gas emissions and climate risks.”).
94. The U.S. Conference of Mayors has produced a document in which 1054 mayors representing
almost eighty-nine million people have agreed to GHG reductions in a similar fashion to that set forth
in the Kyoto Protocol. See U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, Mayors Climate
Prot. Ctr., http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
95. Union of the Baltic Cities, http://www.ubc.net (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (“Union of the Baltic
Cities is a voluntary, proactive network mobilizing the shared potential of over 100 member cities for
democratic, economic, social, cultural and environmentally sustainable development of the Baltic Sea
Region.”).
96. 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2301–3504 (2012) (seeking to preempt local zoning ordinances that
regulate oil and gas operations). This law was partially struck down in Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth,
52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012). A number of local coastal communities are experiencing similar T-1like scenarios where states are “transfer[ing] authority over armoring from local to state control.” J. Peter
Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights, and Time, 73 La. L. Rev. 69, 97 n.127
(2012) (citing Maryland’s Living Shoreline Protection Act of 2008, Md. Code Ann., Envir. § 16-201
(Westlaw 2012); Connecticut’s Act Concerning the Coastal Management Act and Shoreline Flood and
Erosion Control Structures, S.B. 376, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2012)).
97. In theory, a T-2 scenario may also exist where local governments are insulated from state
action, and the local governments fail to take action. As discussed above, a more common scenario is T-3,
where the state maintains some authority to reassume control or concurrently regulate. See supra note 92.

Hudson_19 (Hudson) (Do Not Delete)

1312

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

5/24/2013 4:34 PM

[Vol. 64:1273

regulate local government activities, a lack of local government collective
action when authorized by home rule or enabling laws, or a narrow
judicial interpretation of home rule provisions and the prohibition on
extraterritorial actions preventing local governments from taking actions
they otherwise might take. This structure subjects the depletable state
natural capital to rivalry by non-excludable local governments that may
either choose to appropriate the resource unit of natural capital over
which they maintain control from the state if the state does not intervene,
or may even be compelled to do so by state law.
D. Local Governance Commons
At the lowest scale on the governance commons, private sector
actors compete for vital natural resources most immediately within the
bounds of the local government in which their property is situated. Land
use activities undertaken by private property owners who fail to selfcoordinate or who are not governed by local rules for appropriating
natural capital can remove or mismanage vast amounts of natural capital
that could be used to sequester carbon, with tragic climate change
impacts. Urban sprawl, subnational forest management, and wetland
disturbance/disappearance each constitute valuable case studies of this
phenomenon. In other words, private property owners are potential
herders on the local commons in the absence of horizontal selfcoordination among property owners or vertical regulatory coordination
arising from local government regulation.
In order to avoid a natural capital commons dilemma at the local
scale, the local government must have the legal authority to vertically
regulate, or private sector actors must have the legal authority to
horizontally coordinate. If neither local government nor private sector
actors have legal authority to vertically regulate or horizontally coordinate
due to federal or state preemption of their ability to do so, then the local
governance commons devolves into a T-4 scenario on the local scale,
where the vertical and horizontal legal authority are absent, and avoiding a
tragedy of the commons can only occur by higher-level action. Higherlevel action would require a jumping of scales, so to speak, in the form of
federal or state vertical regulatory or horizontally coordinated activities—a
scenario we will further analyze in future research.
Alternatively, if states maintain legal authority to act on the national
scale, and an individual state allocates some or all of that legal authority to
local governments to act on the state scale (through Dillon’s Rule or home
rule provisions, and without preemption), a tragedy may be avoided at the
local scale through vertical regulatory action on the part of the local
government. If private parties are left a degree of legal authority to devise
their own commons management solutions notwithstanding local
government regulation, then it may constitute an NT-3 or an NT-5
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scenario (depending on whether private property owners actually do take
action, NT-5, or do not take action, NT-3). For example, landowners
might come together to create a trust or execute formal private land use
98
controls, such as private covenants, to protect forests or wetlands. They
might also enter into forest, wetland, or agricultural cooperatives to
99
achieve sustainable resource management. If local government
regulation completely preempts private property owner authority, then it
is an NT-1 scenario. For example, as discussed further in Part III,
Washington County Maryland’s Forest Conservation Ordinance, which
requires that developers of projects removing 40,000 square feet of forest
submit a mitigation plan for approval, arguably represents an NT-1
100
scenario at the local scale.
It is also possible that the federal or state governments may
maintain authority to vertically regulate—and that they will do so in a
way that prevents local governments from also acting—but that allows
for concurrent, private-property owner horizontal action. This is the NT2 scenario at the local scale, where the local government does not
maintain legal authority but private property owners can self-coordinate.
Finally, private property owners may of their own accord horizontally
coordinate for proper commons resource management in the absence of
otherwise authorized local government regulation (scenario NT-4).
Conversely, scenario T-1 results when a local government maintains
legal authority to vertically regulate, but fails to do so and prevents private
property owners from acting. T-2 results when the state or federal
governments withhold legal authority from local governments to vertically
regulate a resource but allow concurrent private property owner action
that does not then come to fruition. The fracking example represents a T-2
scenario at the local scale, as local governments have been preempted by
state authority. Presumably, private landowners still have the authority to
101
refuse to allow fracking on their property, but many have not done so. T3 results when local governments have the legal authority to act—granted
by the state and not preempted by state or federal authority—but fail to

98. See, e.g., Working Conservation Easements, Pacific Forest Trust, https://www.pacificforest.org/
working-forest-conservation-easements.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (“Working forest conservation
easements provide private landowners the means to permanently conserve their forests for a variety of
public benefits while keeping them in private ownership and productive forestry.”).
99. See, e.g., Sarah F. Ashton et al., Forest Management in the Interface: Forest
Cooperatives (2011).
100. Wash. Cnty., Md., Forest Conservation Ordinance (2008); see infra notes 154–155 and
accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2301–3504 (2012); H.B. 464, 61st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho
2012) (requiring “uniformity and consistency in the regulation” of fracking); Sub. H.B. 278, 25th Gen.
Assemb. (Ohio 2004) (prohibiting local governments from determining placement or permitting of
fracking wells).
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take necessary political action at the same time that private property
owners fail to exercise concurrent management authority.

III. The Climate Governance Commons: Divergent Approaches to
Climate Policy Within Each Nest
Climate change is the quintessential global commons problem. The
atmosphere, when free from human GHG inputs, maintains a climatic
balance that slowly shifts over time due to natural causes. But humans
have rushed the atmospheric commons and flooded it with carbon
dioxide and other GHGs in a remarkably short time period, geologically
102
speaking. As with Hardin’s herders, society has done so because
humans, particularly in the developed world, have received the full
benefit of taking actions that result in the appropriation of resource units
by emitting GHGs, while the negative effects of those emissions (climate
change impacts) are being shared by actors across the entire globe and
across time (i.e., future generations).
Part II established a theoretical foundation for exploring how
different legal authority and political action scenarios within levels of
government horizontally and across governments vertically complicate
natural capital management in a governance commons like a federal
system. The various ways in which those scenarios may play out across
different parts of the United States, and how those differences may be
overcome to address climate change in the United States, are the subject
of future research building upon this Article. This Part, on the other
hand, will provide examples of how within each individual scale action
might be taken either vertically or horizontally to protect natural capital
crucial to combatting climate change, like forests, wetlands, and
agricultural resources.
The description of these two approaches is purposefully divergent and
is oversimplified by design—looking at vertical and horizontal approaches
within each scale in a vacuum. We take this approach because it is
necessary to break into constituent parts the two primary mechanisms by
which commons resources can be managed in federal systems. First, this is
necessary in order to demonstrate more clearly how both vertical and
horizontal approaches may be crafted within each scale, which also
represents the two-dimensional narrative in which the tone of the debate is
often pitched. Second, we wish to provide a foundation for future research
focusing on how both vertical and horizontal approaches play out quite
differently within a third dimension that accounts for different geolegal
and geopolitical challenges across the United States. These challenges, in

102. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Global Climate Change Impacts in the United
States 9 (2009) (“Observations show that warming of the climate is unequivocal. The global warming
observed over the past 50 years is due primarily to human-induced emissions of heat-trapping gases.”).

Hudson_19 (Hudson) (Do Not Delete)

May 2013]

NESTED GOVERNANCE COMMONS

5/24/2013 4:34 PM

1315

turn, drive a need to craft a convergent approach that optimizes the
combination of vertical and horizontal approaches across regions of a
federal system of government (like the United States) to more effectively
address climate change.
At the risk of stating the obvious, natural capital tragedies may result
within each scale because of mismanagement of resources crucial to
successful climate change policy at successive scales. Though individual
entities within scales—whether private property owners or local, state, or
national governments—may altruistically act irrationally and maximize the
conservation and management of natural capital to mitigate climate
change, there remain large gaps regarding the proper management of
climate-crucial natural capital. This is evidenced by urban sprawl and lax
land-use regulation, insufficient forest management standards leading to
potentially grave threats to forests, continued wetland loss, poor
agricultural practices, and so on. These tragedies may occur because
entities within the scale fail to horizontally coordinate, or because
governments higher up the scale fail to coordinate the activities within the
scale.
As discussed above, the failure to horizontally coordinate or vertically
regulate is a product of legal authority and political action scenarios that
vary by scale. Each scale of governance has a unique set of legal
authority/political action permutations to which the actors are bound.
Ultimately, it is these scenarios that shape the degree to which the
management or mismanagement of natural capital within that scale is
likely to result in commons tragedies. It is therefore useful to look to
models of vertical regulatory coordination or horizontal self-coordination
that have been used to successfully manage natural capital within each
scale. These models may apply to different categories of natural capital
that are less relevant to climate change mitigation, but their approaches
may be transferable. These models may also be very familiar in approach
or implementation, as, for example, a national policy aimed at clean water
(the Clean Water Act) might provide a model for federal inputs into forest
regulation. Alternatively, they may be quite unfamiliar and novel, as might
be the case with one local government out of approximately 88,000 in the
United States that has designed a unique and successful policy aimed at
protecting natural capital. To this end, one Subpart below will detail
vertical regulatory coordination for each scale, whereby the next scale up
coordinates the activities of entities within the scale through a top-down
approach to managing natural capital climate commons resources.
Another Subpart will detail what horizontal self-coordination for
managing natural capital climate commons resources would look like
within each scale, whereby private-property owners or similarly situated
governments work with each other to manage resources in the absence of,
or supplemental to, vertical regulatory coordination.
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A. Vertical Regulatory Coordination
Vertical regulatory coordination for climate change at the global scale
would seek to accomplish many of the same objectives that have been
discussed in the international community but which have yet to be
implemented via a treaty-based climate change response. The Kyoto
Protocol provides an example of an international framework that seeks to
achieve legally binding emissions limits on individual countries agreed
103
upon at the international level. This approach has yet to succeed in
gaining the support of the most significant global emitters of carbon, and
indeed some scholars have noted that in the absence of global consensus
the process has broken down into a variety of transnational, regional
104
approaches to addressing climate change. Nonetheless, given both the
ever-shifting climate and ever-shifting political attitudes, such a treaty
could emerge in the future. While the Kyoto Protocol focuses primarily on
emissions limits—the source component of carbon—a treaty might also
focus on the preservation of natural capital crucial as a carbon sink, like
forests, wetlands, and agricultural resources. Each of these, as described
above, are the resources most affected by the overlay of the governance
commons in the U.S. federal system given the current division of
federal/subnational regulatory authority over their management. Of
course, a combined approach regulating both carbon emissions and sinks
might be a viable option as well, whereby vertical emissions limits result in
carbon offset markets that drive the preservation of forests, wetlands, and
agricultural lands. No matter the target of vertical regulation—and though
the examples of successful vertical regulatory coordination are rare at the
global level—success stories exist and provide one mechanism for
addressing global commons concerns notwithstanding the current
pessimism regarding treaty viability.
The Montreal Protocol is instructive on this point. The Protocol is
one of the most successful international agreements, having been ratified
105
by nearly 200 countries, and it “provides a useful model for other long-

103. Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 Va. L. Rev. 63, 71 n.30 (2013) (“The Kyoto
Protocol is the world's only legally binding agreement on climate change.” (citing United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Q&A with UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christina
Figures: The UNFCCC and the UN Climate Change Conference in Durban (2011)); José Antonio
Urrutia, The Equator Principles or How the Way to Do Business Has Changed, 54 Rocky Mountain
Min. L. Inst. 16-1 (2008) (“The major feature of the Kyoto Protocol is that it sets binding targets for
37 industrialized countries and the European community for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions.”).
104. See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change, 30 Envt. &
Plan. C: Gov’t & Pol’y 571 (2012); Daniel Bodansky, A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and
Future U.N. Climate Change Regime (Mar. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1773865.
105. Status of Ratification, United Nations Environment Programme (Jan. 2, 2013), http://ozone.
unep.org/new_site/en/treaty_ratification_status.php.
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term environmental challenges such as climate change.” In fact, in “no
other treaty have so many disparate actors in international society
successfully cooperated and compromised to address a global
107
environmental threat.” The Montreal Protocol took a prescriptive
approach to the ozone problem, freezing both production and
consumption levels of ozone-depleting CFCs and other chemicals as well
as implementing a reduction schedule for their use. Importantly, these
standards were set and agreed upon at the international level and
subsequently agreed to by a vast majority of nations, rather than being
merely targets or commitments developed domestically. The Protocol
further prescribed strict trade measures on products containing or
produced by the use of CFCs to encourage treaty signage and
108
ratification.
In addition to prescriptions, the Protocol further provided technical
and financial assistance to aid developing countries that might be limited
109
Finally, the Protocol adopted a flexible
in achieving reductions.
approach allowing evolution over time, with parties assessing and
reviewing controls at least every four years so that if “any of the controlled
substances were found to be less harmful than thought or the schedules
proved too stringent, the Protocol’s reduction schedules could be modified
with a two-thirds majority of countries representing two-thirds of global
110
consumption.” The Protocol has been effective in keeping ozone
depletion on the international environmental agenda, and the parties
have “met regularly since 1987, typically to tighten reduction schedules,
bring new chemical substances under control, and establish many rules
and operating procedures to implement what has become a
111
comprehensive regime for managing a growing number of chemicals.”
Though there are current and future challenges to be faced by the
112
Montreal Protocol regime, it has been regarded as a “triumph of
international diplomacy,” reducing CFC and other ozone depleting use
and production in the developed world more than 95% and with
113
developing countries also making strides.
There are, of course, important distinctions between the problems
addressed by the Montreal Protocol and those brought about by climate
change, presenting additional challenges to adopting a global vertical
regulatory approach both with regard to emissions limitations and

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

David Hunter et al., International Environmental Law and Policy 533 (4th ed. 2010).
Id. at 595.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 566–68.
Id. at 595.
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preservation of natural capital carbon sinks. Regarding emissions
limitations, CFCs were used in fewer products and processes globally
(relative to carbon), and as a result fewer sectors of the economy were
implicated. Additionally, alternatives to CFCs became available relatively
quickly, whereas there are very few readily available technologies for
carbon as an energy source, at least on a scale that could rival the
expansive use of carbon globally.
Regarding the preservation of natural capital such as forests,
wetlands, and agricultural resources as carbon sinks, the first challenging
distinction is the connection of these resources to land-use policies. Each
of these resources is implicated by a variety of land-use and other
resource extraction policies related to the development, cultivation, or
other use of land, whereas CFCs are industrial products manufactured or
used in manufacturing processes and entering the stream of commerce.
Tracking CFC emissions levels from a relatively uniform and limited set
of industrial players within a global economic market might seem like an
easy task when faced with the proposition of tracking GHG-emitting or
GHG-sequestering land-use activities undertaken across a spectrum from
individuals all the way up to corporations and governments—each
engaged in a myriad of different economic endeavors on every square
inch of surface area within a country. Virtually everywhere and everyone
within a jurisdiction are implicated within any single land-use policy.
Achieving adjustments of land use policies would also prove more
difficult than emissions limitations because the division among levels of
government vertically and across jurisdictions horizontally would require
a far greater degree of coordination than a centralized authority setting
standards across the country for an industry emitting or producing a
handful of readily identifiable gases.
Yet, despite these challenges, countries may one day agree to take
action on both carbon emissions limitations and natural capital
preservation. Indeed, for a time the Montreal Protocol seemed doomed to
fail, until the political and scientific winds shifted enough to make the
114
threat of ozone depletion to global populations very real. As a result, it
seems premature to match the doom and gloom tone of climate change
dialogue with a similar tone regarding the probability or efficacy of vertical
global action to address it. For GHG emissions limitations, nations may
agree to be bound to legal requirements that they achieve certain
reductions in emissions over set periods of time, with economic and other
penalties doled out at the international level in the event of
noncompliance. Yet emissions reductions generally do not present the
nested commons problems presented by the preservation of certain
carbon-critical natural capital as GHG sinks. Emissions reductions tend to

114. See generally Hunter, supra note 106, ch. 10.
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focus on regulation of industrial players involved in the national and global
stream of commerce, which is far less impacted by the fragmented
jurisdictions present in a federal system of government, at least in the
United States.
A global, legally binding treaty requiring the preservation of forests,
wetlands, or agricultural resources, on the other hand, would be just the
type of vertical regulatory arrangement complicated by the nested
governance commons. Yet preservation of these types of natural capital
could also be the most effective and efficient mechanism for combating
climate change. Restrictions on industrial emissions, transportation
emissions, or emissions from other sectors are often seen as potentially
costly climate mitigation methods, due to technological and economic
constraints of changing methods of production or energy portfolios over
short time scales. On the other hand, the preservation of existing forest,
wetlands, or agricultural resources requires little upfront cost, other than
the potential cost of foregone development (which would likely be carbon
intensive at any rate). And restoration of certain natural capital, like
forests, is relatively low cost also, requiring far less significant human and
financial capital expenditures to achieve than pure industrial emissions
reductions.
A global forest protocol, long the subject of discussion at the
115
international level, could require certain stand density standards for
participant countries’ forests, as well as riparian buffer zone, clearcutting, road-building, afforestation and reforestation, and a variety of
other forest practice requirements that have impacts on GHG sources
116
and sinks from forestry. As the Montreal Protocol proceeded regarding
financial and technological assistance, a forest protocol could also
facilitate investment mechanisms like those already on the table at the
international level, such as Reduced Emissions from Forest Degradation
and Destruction (“REDD”) programs, or what has become known as
“REDD-plus.” REDD-plus seeks to curb forest destruction and
degradation and enhance forest carbon stocks, but also promotes
“conservation [and] sustainable management of forests . . . in developing
117
through programs aimed at alleviating rural poverty,
countries”
118
conserving biodiversity, and sustaining forest ecosystem services. These
programs could promote afforestation or forest preservation within
individual nations in need of such projects and where the institutional or

115. See Blake Hudson, Climate Change, Forests, and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the Trees,
82 U. Colo. L. Rev. 363, 372–78 (2011).
116. Constance L. McDermott et al., Global Environmental Forest Policies: An International
Comparison 15–18 (2010).
117. Found. for Int’l Envtl. L. & Dev., Guide for REDD-Plus Negotiators 4 (2011).
118. Charlie Parker et al., The Little REDD+ Book 14 (3d ed. 2009).
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political capacity does not exist to effectively carry out the prescriptive
dictates of an international regime absent such assistance.
Similarly, a wetland protocol might provide prescriptions on the
filling or destruction of wetlands deemed of critical importance within
nations, and might also set up international investment mechanisms for
wetland restoration. These prescriptions could serve the purpose of both
providing a sink for carbon as well as preserving or restoring wetlands as
natural capital crucial to curb coastal land loss and threats to human
119
An
settlements caused by increased hurricane and flood events.
international agricultural protocol might set limits on crop cultivation, such
as soil tillage (carbon) and fertilizer use (nitrous oxide), or livestock
120
manure management or diet (methane). It might also set up investment
mechanisms to establish biofuel or methane energy generation
technologies in areas where adoption of such technologies would be cost
prohibitive. The use of forests and agricultural resources for energy in
lieu of fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide, but “this CO2 is of recent
atmospheric origin (via photosynthetic carbon uptake) and displaces CO2
121
which otherwise would have come from fossil carbon.” In other words,
even though these fuels might be cultivated from agricultural or forest
carbon sinks, “the primary GHG benefits of these options can generally
122
be treated as equivalent to permanent emission reductions.”
Even if a stand-alone forest, wetland, or forest protocol is never
developed, potentially significant mechanisms for encouraging wetland,
forestland, and agricultural resource conservation and preservation are
offset programs that are coupled with or subsumed under another
prescriptive vertical regulatory program, such as a regulatory cap-andtrade or carbon taxation system. Indeed, most iterations of proposed
domestic carbon cap and trade legislation in the United States have
provided for carbon offset projects driven by investment in, or credit
purchases from, approved carbon sequestration projects—particularly
123
those related to forests. In addition, the United States has considered
agricultural offset programs to encourage conservation tillage, reduction
of nitrogen fertilizer, changing manure management practices, and
124
converting agricultural lands to forests or grasslands. These programs

119. See Blake Hudson, Coastal Land Loss and the Mitigation-Adaptation Dilemma: Between
Scylla and Charybdis, 73 La. L. Rev. 31, 61 (2012).
120. See Hudson, supra note 47.
121. Smith et al., supra note 44, at 499.
122. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Potential in U.S. Forestry and
Agriculture 2–9 (2005).
123. See Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007); see also American
Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey Bill), H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009); Dingell-Boucher
Cap-and-Trade Bill, Inst. for Energy Research (Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.
org/2008/10/07/dingell-boucher-cap-and-trade-bill.
124. See John Horowitz & Jessica Gottlieb, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Econ. Research Serv., Econ.
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have heightened appeal over stand-alone arrangements for either
emissions reductions or natural capital preservation because policies aimed
at reducing emissions alone from the forest, agricultural, or development
sectors (in the case of wetlands) may not be as attractive as those that both
125
reduce emissions and increase productivity of operations. Increasing
productivity may occur through expansion or adjustment of agricultural
or forestry operations in a way that causes more carbon to be
sequestered, or by simply offsetting or perhaps even increasing profits
displaced by emissions reduction expenses. It is true that offset projects
have raised concern in some sectors regarding leakage, permanence,
additionality, and other issues. Still, others have called for incorporating
126
farming and land use offset investments into cap-and-trade programs.
A treaty might also require an adjustment in domestic subsidy
programs related to natural capital cultivation and preservation. For
example, the United States is one of the largest subsidizers of agriculture
in the world, paying billions each year, with many subsidies supporting
127
GHG-intensive commodity crop production. These subsidies largely
“exacerbate chemical use, the expansion of cropland to sensitive areas, and
overexploitation of water and other resources, while distorting trade and
128
reinforcing unsustainable agricultural practices.” Yet, an international
arrangement might follow the lead of the European Union, which in 2003
began requiring that certain environmental requirements must be met
129
before agricultural interests could receive subsidies. Similarly, perhaps
an international regime could require that domestic subsidies within
participant countries not be granted unless certain natural capital
preservation and carbon sink activities were taken within forests, for
wetlands, or on agricultural lands.
Ultimately, vertical regulatory coordination at the global level,
whether for emissions reductions, natural capital preservation, the
inclusion of offset programs for natural capital within a prescriptive
emissions reduction regime, subsidy restrictions, or otherwise, may require
nations to give up a degree of sovereignty over each of these subject areas
if legal requirements or targets for carbon emissions, or forest, wetland,
and agricultural resource preservation are to be met. Even so, we have

Brief No. 15, The Role of Agriculture in Reducing Greenhouse Gases 1 (2010).
125. See Smith, supra note 44, at 515.
126. Sara J. Scherr & Sajal Sthapit, Worldwatch Inst., Mitigating Climate Change Through
Food and Land Use 6 (2009). For a review of the offset potential of agriculture, see Roger Claassen
& Mitch Morehart, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Econ. Research Serv., Econ. Brief No. 14, Agriculture
Land Tenure and Carbon Offsets (2009).
127. See Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural Policy
in a Changing Global Environment, 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 593, 597 (2010).
128. Scherr & Sthapit, supra note 126, at 32.
129. See Daniel Bianchi, Cross Compliance: The New Frontier in Granting Subsidies to the
Agricultural Sector in the European Union, 19 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 817, 820 (2007).
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succeeded before in crafting just such a regime, and though the challenges
are more varied, complex, and numerous, when the metaphorical hole in
the ozone becomes large enough for the international community in the
context of climate change, we may be able to coordinate and take action
far more effectively than seems possible now.
In a way, shifting from the global to the national scale provides little
room to expound on vertical regulatory approaches, since most of the
approaches described above as part of a binding global treaty would be
implemented by national regulations. In addition, in the United States,
federal legislation on capping or taxing carbon emissions has yet to be
enacted, and there is currently very little in the way of federal regulation of
natural capital like forests, wetlands, or agricultural resources, aside from
activities that occur on federally owned lands, of course. For example,
130
federally owned forests make up more than one-third of U.S. forests.
131
Thus, national parks, wilderness areas and forests subject to the roadless
132
rule may be considered de facto natural capital preservation areas.
Policies on these lands could certainly change at any time, but currently
they protect a significant quantity of resources crucial to combating
climate change.
Despite the current lack of vertical regulatory approaches at the
national level, the United States could pass a federal statute pursuant to
Commerce Clause authority setting emissions limitations or standards for
natural capital preservation. In the forest context, the federal government
could enact statutes setting stand density, riparian buffer zone, clearcutting, road-building, afforestation, or reforestation requirements for
private forest owners. This would remedy the wide degree of regulatory
inconsistency across states managing important forest resources. While the
Commerce Clause case is strong for regulating private property owners
engaged in the forest products market, the question becomes trickier in the
context of preserving forests as carbon sinks—that is, preventing forests
from being cleared, not by foresters, but by entities seeking to use the land
for commercial or residential development. This might be achieved by the
establishment of urban growth boundaries at the national level, setting a
maximum standard of development density around cities of a certain size
to forestall urban sprawl. Furthermore, any of the objectives described
above could be a corollary of a national emissions cap-and-trade or
carbon tax scheme that allows for forest offsets, as discussed above (or
wetland or agricultural operation offsets).

130. See Forestry, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/forestry.html (last
updated June 27, 2012).
131. Bryan Finegan, Forest Succession, 321 Nature 109 (1984).
132. Roadless Area Conservation, U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. Forest Serv., http://www.fs.usda.gov/
help/roadless (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
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The federal government might pass a similar statute aimed
specifically at the preservation of wetlands as a carbon sink. Indeed, the
federal government already maintains what might be considered a federal
natural capital preservation statute aimed at private lands in the form of its
133
§ 404 wetland fill permitting program. Though the Clean Water Act’s
prohibition on the dredging and filling of wetlands facilitates potential
federal government conservation or preservation of carbon-loaded
wetlands, a vast majority of wetland fill permits are currently approved
despite the potential of wetlands to sequester substantial quantities of
134
carbon. The Clean Water Act does not explicitly contemplate impacts on
climate prior to approving a fill permit. Rather, the Clean Water Act
focuses primarily on water quality impacts, allowing wetlands to be filled
when there is no practicable alternative less damaging to aquatic resources
135
and when national waters would not be significantly degraded.
Nonetheless, the program does require wetland offsets that could be
significant carbon sinks—if the program were to be utilized more
136
aggressively. Additional tweaks in the § 404 program may allow it to play
a more substantial role in preserving wetlands. The § 404 program
137
presently exempts “normal agricultural operations.” Some scholars have
argued that removal of this exemption “could protect many jurisdictional
wetlands that are currently allowed to be plowed with impunity,” and that
“without the exemption for those wetlands that are impacted, mitigation
would be required to offset the functions impacted by the agricultural
activities, as is required for other types of activities that impact
138
jurisdictional wetlands.”
In addition to forests and wetlands, the federal government’s primary
involvement in agricultural policy is through the provision of subsidies for
agricultural operations. There is little reason, besides politics, that the

133. See Brandee Ketchum, Note, Like the Swamp Thing: Something Ambiguous Rises from the
Hidden Depths of Murky Waters—The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Murky Wet Land in Rapanos v.
United States, 68 La. L. Rev. 983, 1011 (2008). The CWA is one of two such federal statutes, since the
Endangered Species Act and its focus on species and critical habitat might also be characterized as a
federal natural capital preservation statute, even on private lands.
134. The Corps receives approximately 80,000 permit requests annually, and only about 9% are
required to go through a “detailed evaluation for an individual permit.” Id. at 1011. Most are approved
through a nationwide or region-specific permit. Id. at 1011–12. Of the 9% required to file for an
individual permit, less than 0.3% are denied. Id. at 1012. The EPA only exercised its veto authority
over Corps wetland permitting eleven times between 1972 and 2007. Id.; see Craig Pittman &
Matthew Waite, Paving Paradise: Florida’s Vanishing Wetlands and the Failure of No Net
Loss 167 (2009).
135. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA843-F-04-001, Wetlands Regulatory Authority, available
at http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/reg_authority.pdf (last accessed Feb. 25, 2013).
136. Leonard Shabman & Paul Scodari, The Future of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 Choices
Mag. 65, 65 (2005). See generally Pittman & Waite, supra note 134.
137. Clean Water Act § 404(f)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–387 (2012).
138. Angelo, supra note 127, at 642.
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federal government could not use its subsidy program to effectively coerce
changes in agricultural operations related to GHG emissions and sinks,
such as soil tillage (carbon) and fertilizer use (nitrous oxide), or livestock
manure management or diet (methane), much as has the European Union.
Shifting to the state scale, we might also see state regulations take the
many forms described above related to both emissions caps or natural
capital preservation. While a cap-and-trade program for carbon emissions
has not materialized at the federal level, the state of California has recently
created such a program, and one that provides a model for other states
seeking to both cap carbon emissions as well as establish markets for
139
natural capital preservation. The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006,
also known as “AB 32,” has a goal of capping and reducing GHG
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2020 and achieving an 80% reduction
140
from 1990 levels by 2050. AB 32 also provides a GHG offset program for
certain types of agricultural (livestock-related) and forestry (including
141
urban forestry) projects. Entities may use offset credits to meet up to 8%
142
of their triennial compliance obligation under the program.
Rather than tying natural capital preservation to voluntary offset
markets embedded in emissions reduction regulations, state governments
may use their land use regulatory authority to zone for the conservation
or preservation of agricultural lands, wetlands, or forestlands. An
example would be the Maryland Forest Conservation Act, which requires
all counties in Maryland with less than 200,000 acres of forest cover to
143
adopt ordinances to conserve forests. The Forest Practices Act in
144
Washington is one of the most stringent forest management regulations
in the country. In addition to setting strict standards regarding riparian
buffer zone, reforestation, and other forest management standards, the act
145
also serves a preservation function. If a landowner plans to convert
forests without an approved forest practices application declaring that
the forest will be converted, the Washington Department of Natural
Resources will issue a “notice of conversion” to the local government
146
where the property is located. The local government then is required to
deny a building or subdivision permit application for the property for six

139. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, ch. 488, §§ 1–2 (West 2006).
140. Cap-and-Trade Program, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last reviewed Apr. 10, 2013).
141. Compliance Offset Program, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., http://www.arb.ca.gov/
cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm (last reviewed Mar. 1, 2013).
142. Id.
143. Forest Conservation Ordinance, Wash. Cnty., Md., Dep’t of Planning & Zoning,
http://www.washco-md.net/planning/forest.shtm (last modified May 30, 2012).
144. Wash. Code § 76.09 (2012), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=76.09.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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147

years from the time of the notice of conversion. This provides a strong
incentive for private property owners to curb their rationality and gain
approval of a higher-level authority before appropriating forest resources.
Contrast this approach to that regarding forests in the southeastern United
States, where most states maintain forest management “best practices”
that are entirely voluntary, where there is no regulatory oversight of forest
operations, much less a comprehensive state regulation to ensure the
conservation or preservation of forest resources.
Michigan has its own wetland regulatory program, whereby property
owners must receive a state permit to fill, use, drain, or develop wetlands
over a certain acreage and connected to the Great Lakes or inland ponds,
148
lakes, rivers, and streams. Even “isolated wetlands” not covered by the
federal § 404 program or connected to any of these waterways or larger
than a certain acreage may be covered under the regulatory program if the
“DEQ has determined that these wetlands are essential to the preservation
149
of the state’s natural resources and has notified the property owner.” It is
this latter focus on isolated wetlands that may not be reached by the § 404
program that make these types of vertical regulatory approaches on the
state scale arguably more effective at wetlands preservation than the § 404
program. Indeed, Maine, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Massachusetts, Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia,
Florida, Minnesota, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Oregon all maintain
150
isolated wetland protections. In an example of bridging state and local
scales, most of these regulations are “cooperative state/local regulatory
efforts where much of the actual regulation is achieved in cooperation with
151
local governments.”
State governments may also develop urban growth boundaries to
protect agricultural, wetlands, and/or forestlands. Oregon is instructive
152
on this point, maintaining a comprehensive growth boundary plan, and
protecting rural lands outside the boundary including non-urban
153
agricultural and forested lands.

147. See Forest Practices Act, Mun. Research & Servs. Ctr. of Wash., http://www.mrsc.org/
subjects/environment/forest/forest.aspx (last updated Sept. 2010) (providing detailed information on
the Washington Forest Practices Act).
148. Geomare-Anderson Wetlands Protection Act, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Act pt. 303, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 451, available at http://legislature.mi.gov/doc.aspx?mcl-451-1994-iii-1inland-waters-303.
149. See State and Federal Wetlands Regulation, Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality, http://www.michigan.gov/
deq/0,4561,7-135-3313_3687-10801--,00.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
150. See generally Jon Kusler, Ass’n of State Wetland Managers, Inc., The SWANCC
Decision and State Regulation of Wetlands (2004).
151. Id.
152. Or. Dep’t. of Land Conservation & Dev., OAR 660-015-0000(14), Oregon’s Statewide
Planning Goals & Guidelines (2006).
153. Rural Development in Oregon, Or. Dep’t. of Land Conservation & Dev., http://www.oregon.
gov/LCD/pages/ruraldev.aspx#Rural_Development_in_Oregon (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
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Finally, shifting to the local scale demonstrates how intertwined
state governments are with the local governments that they empower to
either implement state regulatory plans or pass their own regulatory
programs. Providing yet another demonstration of the nested, scalebridging nature of federal governance and resource commons, the
Maryland statute described above, requiring local governments to
develop forest preservation plans, results in a variety of regulatory
approaches by local governments. One example is Washington County
154
which requires that
Maryland’s Forest Conservation Ordinance,
development of land that is projected to remove at least 40,000 square
feet of forest must submit a mitigation plan to the county planning
commission. Mitigation options available to private or government
property owners include on-site retention or planting, off-site retention
or planting, natural regeneration, and payment-in-lieu of planting or
retention. The funds generated by the payment-in-lieu of planting option
are used to facilitate conservation easement purchases and forest
planting operations in sensitive environmental areas, thus providing “the
opportunity to plant and then protect, by easement, large contiguous
areas of forest rather than promote small-scattered forested areas in
155
order to enhance optimum benefit to the environment.”
Washington also has a number of local governments engaged in the
preservation of natural capital within local jurisdictions. The city of
Bellingham, for example, maintains a municipal code regulating the
clearing of any removal of vegetation, including trees, on any lot or
156
property within the city. Similarly, Monroe issues land-clearing permits
157
for the conversion of all forests within the municipality. Issaquah actually
places a six-year moratorium on the conversion of forests currently
158
managed under a forests practices permit to other development.
Regarding wetlands, between four and six thousand local
governments have adopted local wetland regulations in order to conserve
159
wetlands via the zoning process. These regulations focus on the
preservation of wetlands, offsetting wetlands that are filled for
160
development, or the usage of wetlands for flood control.
Not only might local governments engage in preservation of natural
capital like forests or wetlands—or the aforementioned zoning to preserve
agricultural open space free from development—but governments might

154. Wash. Cnty., Md., Forest Conservation Ordinance, supra note 100.
155. Forest Conservation Ordinance, supra note 143.
156. Bellingham, Wash., Mun. Code ch. 16.60.50 (1992).
157. Monroe, Wash., Mun. Code ch. 20.08 (2012).
158. Issaquah, Wash., Mun. Code ch. 16.26.185 (2012).
159. See Jon Kusler, Ass’n of State Wetland Managers, Inc., Common Questions: Local
Government Wetland Protection Programs 2 (2006).
160. Id.
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also engage in vertical regulation of emissions. San Francisco officials
recently adopted a rule to control emissions from one particular cement
161
plant in Cupertino. While not focused on carbon, but rather nitrogen
oxides, particulate matter, and mercury, these limits are more stringent
than the suggested federal standards. The impetus for the regulation was
citizen concern over health impacts and, although many GHGs are not as
obvious of a health concern and local governments have a race-to-thebottom incentive to refuse carbon emissions regulations in their local
jurisdiction, there is no reason that local governments could not begin to
regulate carbon emissions much the same way many vertically regulate
carbon sinks like forests or wetlands.
B. Horizontal Self-Coordination
Horizontal self-coordination among federal, state, or local
governments or private sector parties explores “how a group of principals
who are in an interdependent situation can organize and govern
themselves to obtain continuing joint benefits when all face temptations to
162
free-ride, shirk, or otherwise act opportunistically.” It is an attempt by
similarly situated actors to coordinate their appropriation of a commons
resource to avoid a tragedy of the commons. The horizontal selfcoordinated approach differs from the vertical regulatory approach set
forth above in that at each scale a higher scale entity does not set standards
of appropriation, monitor appropriation, or sanction misappropriation.
Rather, the actors are actively involved in managing the resource. They
coordinate their efforts as independent bodies and cooperatively develop
objectives relevant to appropriation with other similarly situated actors.
They then achieve those objectives through collective regulation,
oversight, and sanctions. Critical attributes of successful common pool
resource management through horizontal collaboration have been detailed
163
Those attributes include
in the factual and theoretical literature.

161. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., Reg. 9, Rule 13 (Sept. 19, 2012), available at http://www.
baaqmd.gov/~/media/Files/Planning%20and%20Research/Rules%20and%20Regs/reg%2009/RG0913.ashx.
162. See Ostrom, supra note 13, at 29.
163. See id. at 90–91. Ostrom identifies crucial attributes of successful collaborations, stating that
each attribute is “an essential element or condition that helps to account for the success of these
institutions in sustaining the [common pool resource] . . . and gaining the compliance of generation
after generation of appropriators to the rules in use.” Id. at 90; see also Thomas Dietz et al., The
Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 Science 1907 (2003). A 2010 study of ninety-one empirical
studies applying the attributes identified by Ostrom found:
[T]he principles are well supported. The most trenchant critiques were abstract, rather than
empirical. This does not mean that the principles are complete; their incompleteness is the
most important empirical critique we found in the literature. Other factors such as the size
of user groups, differing types of heterogeneity within or between user groups, and the type
of government regime within which users operate are clearly important in many cases.
Michael Cox et al., A Review of Design Principles for Community-Based Natural Resource
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management approaches that define clear boundaries and users, adopt
rules concerning appropriation that are based on local conditions,
incorporate flexibility to modify rules, monitor usage, impose graduated
sanctions, provide conflict-resolution mechanisms, insulate from higher
164
scale interference, and organize in multiple levels of nested enterprises.
In the context of climate change, horizontal coordination on the
global scale is an attempt to cooperatively organize, manage, and control
global GHG emissions through collaboration among national
governments. Building off of Ostrom’s collaborative model, a horizontal
self-coordinated approach to address GHG emissions would consist of
individual nations agreeing on target levels of GHG emissions, enacting
domestic standards based on local conditions for achieving those emissions
levels, flexibly adjusting rules for GHG emissions over time as needed,
establishing metrics to measure GHG emissions, monitoring GHG
emissions both domestically and cooperating with other nations to allow
necessary measures of horizontal oversight, establishing horizontally levied
sanctions for exceeding target usage, and adjudicating disputes concerning
165
usage through collaborative engagement with other nations.
Alternatively, individual nations could sustain the global commons
atmosphere and avoid a climate tragedy of the commons by horizontally
collaborating on preserving and developing GHG sinks. Collective action
on protecting, conserving, and growing forests and wetlands or in adjusting
agricultural production methods could result in individual nations working
together to achieve the overall targeted results in a non-competitive, nontragic manner.
While collective action on GHG emissions and sinks exists among
some of the relevant actor nations on the global scale, there is no
horizontal collaboration that incorporates all, or most, nations.
Nonetheless, existing horizontal efforts are instructive on how more robust
forms of horizontal coordination might be achieved on the global scale.
For example, in the wake of failed negotiations on legally binding global
agreements pertaining to GHG emissions, such as a successor to the Kyoto
Protocol, some nations have attempted to horizontally coordinate their
efforts to limit GHG emissions. The framework for Europe 2020: A
European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth provides
166
such an example.
Management, Ecology & Soc’y, Dec. 2010, at 38.
164. See Ostrom, supra note 13, at 91–102.
165. See id. at 92–95, 100–01.
166. Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and
Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020 final (Mar. 3, 2010). Similar examples can be found relative to
GHG sinks. See, e.g., Council Recommendation (EC) No. 413/2002of May 30, 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 148)
24 (recommending that individual nations partner with regional and local authorities (public and
private) to determine who has the authority to control coastal zones with the goal that nations will be
better able to coordinate their efforts when they know who has authority to act).

Hudson_19 (Hudson) (Do Not Delete)

May 2013]

NESTED GOVERNANCE COMMONS

5/24/2013 4:34 PM

1329

Pursuant to the framework, the European Council agreed to a broad
reform strategy that included a plan to combat climate change. In
particular, the Council committed E.U. members to reducing their
167
collective emissions to at least 20% below 1990 levels. While at the
outset this would appear to represent individual actors ceding authority to
a higher body to vertically regulate, importantly, the individual E.U.
member nations did not relinquish sovereignty to the Council or the E.U.
Commission. Rather, the individual members are responsible for
identifying their respective national targets, planning a strategy to achieve
those targets, and monitoring or enforcing the individual nations’ targets.
The Council framework establishes an overall goal, but each individual
168
nation designs its own carbon dioxide emission reduction strategy. The
Council does not mandate the target, nor does it devise the strategy for
achieving the target. While each nation is responsible for creating a plan to
meet its target, those efforts are supported by other E.U. nations through
the collaborative process of sharing information and resources.
By April 2011, each nation had established its own target and a
process for achieving that target. The targets ranged from a 20% increase
169
to a 20% decrease from 1990 levels. The variation in the individual
nation targets illustrates the flexibility embedded in the horizontal
approach. By allowing each actor to develop its targets and strategy based
on individualized local conditions, the collaborative approach does not
170
attempt to force a single standard for multiple and diverse jurisdictions.
This coordinated effort among E.U. nations, however, does not provide
for individual nations (or a higher authority) to monitor and sanction
failure to achieve the targets. Thus, even this example does not fully
incorporate the full scope of recommended elements to achieve a
successful horizontal collaboration at the global scale.
Horizontal self-coordination on the national scale parallels that taking
place on the global scale. Instead of individual nations collaborating,
horizontal self-coordination on the national scale involves collective action
among state government actors to avoid the tragic depletion of natural
resources. When state actors confront commons resources that are not
managed by federal vertical regulation (either by a lack of legal authority
(scenarios NT-2, T-2, T-4) or political action (scenarios NT-4, T-1, T-3)),
states often compete with each other in a “race to the bottom,” resulting in

167. The Council also agreed to achieve 20% of EU energy consumption from renewable
resources and a 20% reduction in primary energy use compared with projected levels through energy
efficiency. Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020, supra note 166, at 11.
168. We recognize that many actions on the global scale incorporate a mixture or hybrid of
horizontal and vertical actions. The Europe 2020 strategy is one such example.
169. Targets can be found at Europe 2020 Targets, Europe 2020, http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/
pdf/targets_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
170. See Ostrom, supra note 13, at 92.
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the overconsumption of natural capital resources. The Apalachicola/
Chattahoochee/Flint river system (“ACF”) provides a good example of
states on the national scale commons actively engaged in an unresolved
competitive conflict over natural capital resources in the absence of federal
vertical regulation. The ACF is composed of the Apalachicola,
Chattahoochee, and Flint Rivers. The Chattahoochee’s headwaters flow
south from the mountains of northern Georgia toward Atlanta. Prior to
reaching Atlanta, the Chattahoochee is delayed by the Buford Dam,
171
forming Lake Lanier. From Atlanta the Chattahoochee flows southwest
and traces the boundary between Georgia and Alabama. The Flint rises
just south of Atlanta, meets with the Chattahoochee at the Georgia172
Florida border, and the two become the Apalachicola. About 75% of the
173
ACF basin lies in Georgia, 12.5% in Florida, and 12.5% in Alabama.
The relevant state actors appropriating from the ACF resource on
the national commons, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, have had a
174
contentious relationship dating back to the 1970s. All of the state actors
are motivated by self-interest that at times includes both overlapping and
175
differing concerns. For a variety of reasons, the parties have been
unable to negotiate a mutually agreed-upon resolution to properly
manage the resource. They have spent enormous amounts of time and
money inefficiently depleting the resource and litigating how much each
actor can appropriate, how often, and for what purposes. As for federal
vertical regulation, the Army Corps of Engineers attempted to address
ACF water allocation issues several times between 1989 and 2009. At
each attempt, one of the states or non-state government actors went to
176
court and succeeded in preventing the Corps from doing so.

171. The Chestatee River also feeds into Lake Lanier.
172. See Heather Ellit, Alabama’s Water Crisis, 63 Ala. L. Rev. 383, 395 (2012).
173. See Steve Leitman, Lessons Learned from Transboundary Management Efforts in the
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin, USA, in Transboundary Water Resources: A Foundation
for Regional Stability in Central Asia 197 (John E. Moerlins et al. eds., 2008).
174. Atlanta is also a relevant actor on the national commons with potentially conflicting interests
and is in competition with the state actors in the ACF dispute. See id. at 198–99. (noting Atlanta’s
interests in growing water demands and maintaining Lake Lanier for recreational purposes). We will
explore this jumping of scales further in further research based on this Article.
175. For example, actors’ self-interest may vary from upstream desires to maximize water
withdrawals for in-state users, maintain reservoir levels for periods of draught, and provide
recreational uses, to downstream desires for commercial navigation, pollution control from upstream
dumping, wildlife preservation, and economic development. See id. at 197–98.
176. See In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1183 (11th Cir. 2011). The
Tarrant Water District represents another example of state actors failing to horizontally coordinate in
the absence of vertical regulation on the national scale. In 2004, Oklahoma passed a law that barred
out-of-state water sales pending the completion of a state-wide water study. Okla. Stat. tit. 82,
§ 1B(A) (2004). Oklahoma’s actor had a large impact on the Fort Worth/Arlington area, which relied
on the Oklahoma-based Red River for its water supply. The Tarrant Water District sought and was
denied rights to purchase water from the Red River. In January 2012 it filed a petition with the
Supreme Court claiming that the Commerce Clause precludes Oklahoma from barring interstate
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Addressing commons dilemmas similar to the ACF conflict through
horizontal self-coordination involves individual states collaborating to selfregulate, monitor, sanction, and adjudicate usage of the commons
resource. It does not involve ceding authority to the federal government or
177
another higher-level entity (such as the Tennessee Valley Authority) to
regulate resource appropriation and management. Rather, the individual
states coordinate their management of the resource to avoid destroying the
resource. In the context of climate change, a theoretical horizontal
collaboration among states would consist of states collectively setting
GHG emission standards, protecting and growing GHG sinks, monitoring
and assessing emissions and sinks, and sanctioning lack of compliance.
In the absence of vertical regulation, the Chesapeake Bay Program is
an example of state actors horizontally coordinating on the national scale
to, among other things, address natural capital commons relevant to
climate change. The Chesapeake Bay Program is a regional partnership
178
among state actors and other public and private entities. The state actors
include the “Principle Partners,” Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland,
and the “Headwater State Partners,” Delaware, New York, and West
179
Virginia. The six states work together to collaborate, share information,
180
and set goals. The states jointly address issues, such as climate adaptation
181
182
and mitigation, relevant to sea level rises and forest restoration. In
December 2007, the state partners committed to conserve and restore
forests in the Bay watershed by, among other things, permanently
protecting an additional 695,000 acres of forest by 2020 and establishing
and implementing mechanisms to track and assess forest land cover
183
change at the county and township level every five years. The state
partners have also engaged in a monitoring program, which is a Bay-wide
cooperative effort to observe numerous physical, chemical, and biological
184
characteristics twenty times a year in the mainstream and tributaries.
Monitoring important natural capital includes observing changes in the
levels of nutrients and sediment, chemical contaminants, plankton,

transfer of water. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
2013 WL 49810 (Jan. 4, 2013) (No. 11-889).
177. The Tennessee Valley Authority’s geographic area covers parts of seven states and addresses
a number of natural capital related issues.
178. Partner Organizations, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/about/
partners (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
179. Id.
180. How We Work, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/about/how (last
visited Feb. 25, 2013).
181. Climate Change, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/issues/issue/
climate_change (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
182. Forests, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/issues/issue/forests (last
visited Feb. 25, 2013).
183. See Partner Organizations, supra note 178.
184. Id.
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benthos, finfish and shellfish, underwater bay grasses, water temperature,
185
salinity, and dissolved oxygen.
As international and federal vertical regulatory actions stall, a
number of states are horizontally collaborating on multi-jurisdictional
186
GHG emission reduction plans. This past summer, governors of all six
New England states agreed to coordinate efforts to make large-scale
187
investments in cost-effective renewable energy resources. The effort
will allow the states to leverage their collective purchasing power, and
avoid the costly process of competing with each other in the way that the
ACF state actors have. In lieu of a race to the bottom, the New England
states’ behavior may more aptly be described as a relay race to the top.
Similarly, the Western Climate Initiative has had a variety of climate
change related successes through state (U.S. state and Canadian province)
188
collaboration. What began as individual states and provinces formulating
their respective emissions reduction plans, morphed into a multijurisdictional effort to collaborate on reducing GHG emissions, develop an
emission trading program, and monitor and track cross-border GHG
emissions. As a horizontal collaboration, the Western Climate Initiative
has no oversight or regulatory authority over the individual states and
provinces. The individual actors remain the primary managers of
appropriation. However, a system of appropriation and monitoring by
the states was never formally adopted, and by 2011, the majority of the
participating U.S. states had formally withdrawn. Importantly, California
and the Canadian provinces continue to develop a regional cap-andtrade market for voluntary and mandatory emission reductions.
Similar to state actors on the national commons, local actors on the
state commons have an opportunity to address mitigation and adaption
measures relevant to climate change in the absence of vertical regulation.
185. Monitoring, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/about/programs/
monitoring (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
186. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns: How the Senate and the White House Missed Their
Best Chance to Deal with Climate Change, New Yorker, Oct. 11, 2011 (detailing the failure of
Congress to pass comprehensive legislation on climate change).
187. Kelsey Lafreniere, New England Governors Announce Clean Energy Resolution on Regional
Procurement, New England Clean Energy Council (July 30, 2012, 5:24 PM), http://www.
cleanenergycouncil.org/blog/2012/07/30/new-england-governors-announce-clean-energy-resolution-onregional-procurement.
188. Current WCI Partners are British Columbia, California, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec. See
WCI Provincial and State Partner Contacts, W. Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/
wci-partners (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). Current WCI, Inc. participants are British Columbia,
California, Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba. See Program Design, W. Climate Initiative,
http://www.wci-inc.org/program-design.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2013); see also Reg’l Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding (Dec. 20, 2005) (establishing the framework for
collaboration among northeast and mid-Atlantic states and creating the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative); Mission Statement, Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/rggi (last visited
Feb. 25, 2013) (listing the participating state actors as Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont).
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Even so, as the scale moves down from the national commons to the
state commons, action by individual actors on multi-jurisdictional issues,
such as climate change, becomes less economically efficient and more
189
irrational. Not only must local actors overcome international, national,
and state legal barriers that may prohibit cohesive (or, at times, any)
local action on climate change, but also there are a combination of social,
political, and economic obstacles that encourage local actors to tragically
deplete resources. Nonetheless, in the face of international, federal, and,
at times, state inaction, local governments—regardless of national and
state affiliation—have horizontally coordinated to tap into expanded
opportunities to tackle climate change.
While many cities are individually reducing their own GHG emissions
and adopting protective ordinances for GHG sinks (and thus acting
190
irrationally), others are attempting to tackle the challenges together
through horizontal collaboration. The following two examples illustrate
the potential to have far-reaching geographical agreements among local
governments that collectively impact millions of individuals and large
economies. Further, the examples exemplify the kind of local preferences
that can drive climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies,
regardless of federal or state action or local government location. They
are an attempt to leverage the collective will and resources of local
governments to avoid a tragedy in the absence of vertical regulation.
The C40 Cities: Climate Leadership Group is a horizontal selfcoordinated effort comprised of local governments across the globe
191
seeking to address climate change. In 2005, representatives from
eighteen megacities agreed to cooperate on “reducing climate emissions by
192
taking decisive and immediate action” Over the next several years, the
cooperative expanded to include fifty-eight megacities, representing 18%
of the global GDP, approximately 8% of the world’s population, and over
193
4700 climate-mitigation or climate-adaption actions. C40 continues to
develop collaborative efforts among municipalities, and it now
collaborates with the Clinton Climate Initiative, World Bank, and
ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability—to facilitate financing and
194
to track, monitor, and report on GHG emissions. Most relevant to
collective action, the C40 city members collaborate on best practices and

189. See Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, supra note 58, at 1022; Rosenbloom,
supra note 4, at 446–62.
190. See Carbon Disclosure Project, Measurement for Management: CDP Cities 2012 Global
Report (2012) (setting forth individual local government initiatives to address climate change).
191. History of the C40, C40 Cities: Climate Leadership Group, http://www.c40cities.org/history
(last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
192. Id.
193. C40 Cities, C40 Cities: Climate Leadership Group, http://www.c40cities.org/c40cities (last
visited Feb. 25, 2013).
194. History of the C40, supra note 191.
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the development of programs to leverage their collective knowledge,
experience, wealth, purchase power, and other assets.
In doing so, the members have initiated programs, such as C40-CCI
Climate Positive Development Programme (supporting and collaborating
on best practices relevant to large urban development projects) and the
Carbon Finance Capacity Building Programme (sharing knowledge for
various local climate and carbon financing ideas), that federal and state
195
governments have been unable or unwilling to develop. Recently, C40
staff have been working more directly with local government staff on
establishing metrics and baselines relevant to climate change and
implementing many of the best practices to support climate action in their
196
respective cities. Because the C40 cities are located in numerous
countries and subnational states and because they represent a significant
portion of the world’s population and GDP, their combined efforts have
the potential not only to alter climate-changing conditions, but also to
motivate other levels of governments to take similar action. And, of
course, if local efforts reach a critical mass, they can efficiently address
global collective action problems in the absence of vertical regulation by
higher levels of government.
Similarly, the Union of the Baltic Cities (“UBC”) was founded in
1991 by thirty-two member cities to foster sustainable development in the
197
Baltic Sea Region. The UBC was created in the wake of social and
environmental changes occurring in the region. Many of the natural
resources bordering on or part of the Baltic Sea had been subjected to
tragic overconsumption in a manner very much resembling the ACF
dispute. In the absence of vertical regulation compelling the sustainable
management of natural resources, 108 cities from ten countries in the
198
Baltic Sea region entered into a collaborative relationship to do so. The
goals of the UBC, as stated in the Statute of the Union of the Baltic Cities,
are:
to promote and strengthen cooperation and exchange of experience
among the cities in the Baltic Sea Region, to advocate for common
interests of the local authorities in the region, and to act on behalf of the
cities and local authorities in common matters towards regional,
national, European and international bodies, as well as achieving
sustainable development in the Baltic Sea Region with full respect to

195. See id.
196. See id.
197. XI General Conference, Liepāja, 5–6 October 2011, Union of the Baltic Cities,
http://www.ubc.net/documentation,56,1006.html (last modified Dec. 8, 2011); UBC Strategy 2010–2015,
Union of the Baltic Cities, http://www.ubc.net/documentation,55,195.html (last modified Jan. 29, 2010).
198. Those countries are Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Poland. Member Cities, Union of the Baltic Cities, http://www.ubc.net/member_cities
(last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
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European principles of local and regional self-governance and
199
subsidiarity.

This definition not only recognizes the multi-jurisdictional challenges
facing local governments (and the corresponding difficulties with
addressing those challenges on the local level), but it also acknowledges
the importance of preserving local sovereignty and the benefits that can be
achieved through local government collaboration, as opposed to vertical
200
regulation. This is reflected in UBC’s actions, which on the one hand
attempt to address many climate commons challenges at the local level
though programs like the UBC Agenda 21 Action Program and BUSTRIPBaltic Urban Sustainable Transport Implementation and Planning, and on
the other hand actively advocate for local governance in Europe through
programs like Challenge of eCitizen: Promoting eGovernment Actions in
201
Cities and MUE-25: Sustainable Future for Cities.
In addition to federal, state, and local governments, private sector
individuals may collectively manage their appropriations of natural capital
resources to avoid a tragedy of the commons. In some ways, the challenges
facing these actors in forming horizontal collaborations are the most
complex, as they are potentially subject to three tiers of vertical regulation
(international, federal, and state) and can quickly jump scales from local to
state to national to global.
Horizontal collaboration among these individuals has taken a
202
variety of forms, many of which have been detailed in Ostrom’s work.
One increasingly common collaborative effort relevant to climate change
and GHG sinks are private sector individuals’ attempts to collectively
preserve forests. Individual landowners’ have collaborated to create
203
trusts to halt the depletion of forests. The Pacific Forest Trust, for
example, is a voluntary horizontal collaboration of landowners (including
199. UBC Statute, Union of the Baltic Cities, http://www.ubc.net/documentation,55,194.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
200. The UBC members are engaged in a host of climate-change-related activities, including
compiling a best practices database that represents their shared experiences. Through this database,
member cities have the ability to learn from past failures and successes of the other member cities. In
addition, the UBC’s Commission on the Environment has implemented the UBC Sustainable Action
Programme, focusing on four sustainability processes: awareness and commitment, management of
resources, management and leadership, and quality of life. Union of the Baltic Cities, UBC
Sustainability Action Programme 2010–2015: Agenda for Sustainable Baltic Cities (2010).
201. See, e.g., Union of the Baltic Cities, Agenda 21 Action Programme 2004–2009, Roadmap for
Sustainable Baltic Cities (2004); BUSTRIP Final Conference, UBC Commission on Environment,
Union of the Baltic Cities, http://www.ubc.net/news,50,396.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013); The
Challenge of Managing Urban Environments, MUE-25 (UBC Commission on Environment Secretariat,
Turku, Finland) (Feb. 2006).
202. See Ostrom, supra note 13.
203. See, e.g., Working Forest Conservation Easements, Pacific Forest Trust, https://www.
pacificforest.org/working-forest-conservation-easements.html (last visited Feb. 25. 2013) (“Working
forest conservation easements provide private landowners the means to permanently conserve their
forests for a variety of public benefits while keeping them in private ownership and productive forestry.”).
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individuals and corporations) that works to obtain conservation
204
easements on forestland. The individual members contribute property
interests in the form of conservation easements and collectively manage
205
the pool of easements for both economic and environmental gain. As
the President and Co-Founder of PFT stated, the “overall impact of
these [easements] is to make natural and environmentally beneficial
206
management more competitive economically.”
This economic benefit is made possible through the leveraging of the
individual actors’ efforts through the horizontal collaborative. The PFT
promotes the growth of older and larger trees before harvest and the
207
conservation of forests from development. PFT maintains a full-time
staff responsible for monitoring easement performance, including visiting
each easement at least once per year, reviewing project plans submitted by
landowners, verifying timber harvest levels against established limits, and
reviewing aerial imagery over time to identify changes not observed with
208
site visits. If necessary, PFT enforces the terms of the easement against
the individual actor misappropriating. In doing so, PFT meets with the
actor to attempt to remedy the issue. If no resolution can be agreed
209
upon, the easement specifies the process for enforcement.
The horizontal collaborative approach is designed to encourage
individual actors on a given scale to proactively reduce GHG emissions
and increase GHG sinks by providing an additional option to avoid the
tragic consumption of natural resources vital to maintaining a stable
climate. It attempts to incentivize action on climate change without
devolving into a tragedy of the commons and without ceding sovereignty
to a higher-level body for standard setting, monitoring, or sanctioning.

Conclusion: A Need for Convergent Nested Commons
Governance
At its core, the purpose of this Article has been to provide a number
of insights into federal governance structure as a complex, multiscalar
commons within which natural capital commons resources are embedded.
The primary contribution of this Article is to deconstruct the scales of a
federal system of government in an attempt to isolate and identify
204. See Laurie A. Wayburn, Conservation Easements as Tools to Achieve Regulatory
Environmental Goals, 74 Law & Contemp. Probs. 175, 181 (2011).
205. Id. “The easements provide financial incentives to landowners to hold their forests longer,
leave more structure after harvest, and provide for a more-complex native forest. The economic
value . . . is appraised, and this value is returned to landowners either directly in the purchase of the
conservation easement, through tax benefits, or a combination thereof.” Id.
206. Id.
207. Email from Ivy Kostick, Stewardship Manager, Pacific Forest Trust, to John Remus, Drake
Law School (July 23, 2012) (on file with authors).
208. See id.
209. See id.
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potential commons resource management complications in individual
governance scales. This Article seeks to demonstrate how a natural capital
commons exists within at least four individual governance scales—private
property owners operating on the local governance commons, local
governments operating on the state governance commons, state
governments operating on the national governance commons, and national
governments operating on the global governance commons. An analysis of
each successive scale reveals that within each two-dimensional (horizontal
and vertical) scale, a number of scenarios may arise with regard to the
existence of horizontal actors’ or vertical governments’ legal authority to
engage in resource management and their political action to sustainably do
so. As represented in Figure 4, these two-dimensional scales are nested
one within another and with multiple nations, states, and local
governments vertically regulating or horizontally coordinating across
scales—creating an even more complex structure that under a number of
circumstances takes on the characteristics of a legally entrenched natural
capital governance commons. This nesting of governance scales, and the
interplay between the commons users and resources within and across
scales, adds a feature to natural capital governance and commons analysis
that is largely overlooked and little understood.
Second, this Article has sought to analyze in an isolated manner the
potential solutions within each scale—either horizontal coordination
among actors appropriating resources on the same scale or vertical
coordination of those actors by the government situated at the next scale
up—and the divergent approaches that may be taken within each to
address climate change. As noted, this divergent analysis was purposefully
oversimplistic, only intending to demonstrate how each of the two
dimensions of resource management may play out within each scale.
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Figure 4

The insights provided in this Article lay a foundation for the next step
in this research that will undertake a more holistic analysis of the legal
authority and political action scenarios influencing resource management
within and across scales. The differing allocations of legal authority among
jurisdictions (geolegal variations) may make vertical approaches more
viable than horizontal approaches in some locations and vice versa. These
geolegal differences come in the form of legal constraints placed either
on higher-level governmental entities that prevent vertical regulation or
on higher- or lower-level entities that prevent them from taking
successful horizontal collective action for resource management. It is our
hope that further research on the third dimension, which helps
incorporate legal authority and political action analysis into commons
resource management, will give rise to a wealth of case-study-based
research on natural capital management in federal systems, and how that
management may be improved to avoid commons tragedies across
vertical and horizontal scales. For example, if a state government legally
preempts local government authority over resource management, then it
may prevent local government vertical regulation or horizontal
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coordination with other local governments, as depicted by B and C
respectively in Figure 5, below. Yet, as also depicted in Figure 5, other
local governments in other states may not be legally preempted in such a
manner and therefore remain free to vertically regulate or horizontally
coordinate. In the same way, the national government may preempt state
authority over certain forms of resource management, preventing vertical
state regulation or horizontal coordination with other states, as depicted
by D and F in Figure 5. If states, on the other hand, maintain exclusive
resource management authority under a national constitution, as with the
Canadian provinces over subnational forest management, then they may
restrict the nation’s ability to engage in horizontal coordination with
other nations (E in Figure 5) as well as that nation’s ability to vertically
regulate (G in Figure 5). These are merely a few general examples.
Future work will analyze specific cases for specific resources to identify
potential solutions that can resolve the governance commons dilemma.
Figure 5
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Similarly, political differences across jurisdictions (geopolitical
variations) may make vertical approaches more viable than horizontal
approaches in some locations and vice versa. For example, and as
described earlier, simple geopolitics makes vertical regulation of forest
management policy more politically viable in the Pacific Northwest than in
the Southeast, where political considerations might block vertical
regulatory efforts at the state or local government levels, as depicted by F
and C in Figure 5. In addition, certain countries maintain political climates
that may block vertical regulatory action, as depicted by G in Figure 5.
Such is arguably the case in the United States, where the failure of the
federal government to provide a more uniform approach to forest
management standards across the nation demonstrates a political choice
not to even test the waters of its potential legal authority under the
Constitution. And of course, on any scale, even in the presence of legal
authority, entities may make political choices not to horizontally
coordinate their activities (depicted in A, B, D, and E in Figure 5).
Ultimately, the success of a two-dimensional solution on a given scale
may vary within and across the scale depending upon the third dimension
of geolegal and geopolitical variations. Case studies on how these
scenarios play out within and among different countries will be valuable to
forging a convergent approach to natural capital management in those
countries that maximizes the vertical regulatory and horizontal
coordination opportunities across jurisdictions.
Not only will future research grapple with the need to account for
geolegal and geopolitical differences in shaping holistic resource
management policies, but it will also grapple with the implications of crosscutting interactions that “jump scales.” For clarity, in this Article we limit
our discussion of upper-scale governance to that immediately scaled up
vertically. That said, we are not suggesting that a single actor functions
identically at all levels, in that a single private property owner acting on the
local scale commons may or may not perceive his situation the same when
framed as acting on the state or national scale commons. Theoretically, as
demonstrated in Figures 4 and 5, horizontal self-coordination of all private
property owners across the United States regarding the management of
certain natural capital could “jump scales” and provide a bottom-up
solution that resolves the commons dilemma all the way up and across the
chain (even to the global level if property owners in other nations did the
same).
Similarly, at the other extreme, if vertical regulatory coordination
occurred at the global scale and was successfully implemented, it could
theoretically resolve commons dilemmas all the way down and across
scales. Indeed, a single appropriator can act on multiple higher levels—
adding complexity to an already complex multi-layered commons
structure. For example, the resource units could be natural capital on
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private property, while the resource system is natural capital present on
the collection of private properties contained within any higher scale—
whether local, state, federal, or global. So private property owners could
be herders appropriating resource units of natural capital from local,
state, federal, and global resource systems simultaneously. Similarly, we
might characterize states as appropriating resource units of natural
capital from either a national resource system or the global resource
system (or both), and so on.
Yet there may also be geolegal and geopolitical barriers to jumping
scales. As a result, vertical regulatory coordination and horizontal selfcoordination approaches again may vary depending on the scale and
region of the country where the policy is instituted. If vertical regulatory
coordination for a type of natural capital management is prohibited at
the national scale due to state government reservation of that legal
authority under the constitution, then horizontal collective action should
be promoted among states to resolve the commons dilemma until an
institutional adjustment is made to change the legal authority status quo.
States may, in turn, work horizontally to harness their individual
vertical regulatory coordination authority to successfully implement
proper management down the scale. If all states do so, this may also
resolve issues up the scale, rendering national vertical regulation
unnecessary. It may also facilitate that nation’s involvement in a global
governance arrangement, or make national government involvement in
such an arrangement unnecessary. Yet the chances of all states doing so
is unlikely—due primarily to geopolitical considerations. Thus while the
commons dilemma may be resolved down the scale within a certain
group of states (Pacific Northwest forests, for example), the nationalscale commons dilemma remains because other herders (states) are
continuing to appropriate forest resources in a tragic manner.
Both the geolegal-geopolitical dimension and the jumping-of-scales
dynamic represent only a few notable observations concerning the
complexity stemming from the three-dimensional federal governance
commons. Yet this complexity has stark implications for climate change
mitigation as actors at every governance scale—local, state, national, and
global—appropriate natural capital essential to combatting climate
change. While each commons within and across scales presents a distinct
body of actors that have diverse perceptions of their respective
commons, they appropriate the same or similar natural capital resources
as actors on other scales. In other words, each scale holds several
potential opportunities to devolve into a tragedy of the commons and
deplete natural resources necessary to combat climate change,
irrespective of the actions taken by appropriators at other levels or on
the same level and dependent very much upon the legal or political
constraints existing in that scale. Thus a “convergent” approach to
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natural capital commons management in federal systems becomes
necessary to fully account for legal constraints that may exist on vertical
regulation across scales or horizontal collective action within scales,
geopolitical circumstances positively or negatively impacting political
action within scales, and the ability of management actions on one scale
to “jump” to higher or lower scales to resolve commons dilemmas.
Recognizing the impacts that geolegal constraints and geopolitical
differences have on the viability of vertical or horizontal policies, a
convergent approach encourages the proper management of natural
capital resources by more fully accounting for the complexities of the
governance commons that is a federal system of government.

